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BUSHv. GORE: LOOKING AT BAKER v.
CARR IN A CONSERVATIVE MIRROR
Robert f. Pushaw, Jr.*
A Southern state engages in electoral shenanigans, thereby
precipitating a national crisis. Most United States Supreme
Court Justices conclude that the ordinary political process will
not remedy the problem. Unfortunately for them, the justiciability doctrines and federalis~I?- generally prohibit federal judicial
intervention in state electoral matters, absent a clear and egregious violation of the Constitution (such as racial discrimination). Although the state's action strikes these Justices as unfair,
it does not run afoul of any federal constitutional provision.
Undaunted, they make up new equal protection law and hold
that the state has failed to comply with it. Several Justices bitterly dissent that the majority's blatant political interference will
erode respect for the Court as the impartial guardian of the rule
of law.
Why bother with yet another recap of Bush v. Gore? 1 Because the exact same summary applies to Baker v. Carr. 2 There
the Warren Court perceived a crisis that defied a political solution: Tennessee and many other states had always apportioned
legislative districts to reflect various interests (e.g., geographic,
political, economic, and demographic), often with the aim of
maintaining the electoral strength of conservative rural areas visa-vis the rapidly growing (and predominantly liberal) cities and
suburbs. 3 The Court found justiciable a claim that the Equal
* Earl F. Nelson Professor, University of Missouri School of Law; Visiting Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D., Yale, 1988. Thanks to Tracey George,
Chris Guthrie, Grant Nelson, Jim Pfander, and the editors of Constitutional Commentary for their help in shaping the ideas in this Essay.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) {per curiam).
2. 369 u.s. 186 (1962).
3. See id at 187-95 (describing this allocation of legislative seats); see also id. at
268-69, 301-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Although the Justices did not mention the
ideological implications of apportionment, rural overrepresentation entrenched the political power of conservatives against more liberal urbanites, whose voting numbers had
skyrocketed as Americans migrated to cities and as property qualifications for voting
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Protection Clause required apportionment to be based solely on
population, despite the dissenters' arguments that (1) nothing in
that Clause, or any other constitutional provision, authorized
this result, and (2) the majority had abandoned the principles of
judicial restraint embedded in the ideas of stare decisis, justiciability, and federalism.
For the past four decades, the Court has steadfastly adhered
to Baker and the "one person, one vote" standard it spawned.
Moreover, although some legal scholars initially criticized Baker,
within a few years they had generally accepted its validity, and
today the opinion meets with near-universal acclairn. 4 In short,
Baker is an unassailable twentieth-century landmark.
Therefore, it should hardly be surprising that the Court decided Bush precisely the way it decided Baker. Once again, an
electoral emergency arose-the 2000 presidential candidates'
deadlock in Florida-that struck the majority as insoluble
through normal political channels. Once again, over acrimonious dissents, the Court created an unprecedented equal protection "right" (to state government consistency in counting votes)
and ignored concerns for both federalism (which counseled deference to Florida officials as they tried to work out the ballot
disputes) and justiciability (which militated against judicial review, at least until the state and Congress had completed their
constitutional roles in selecting the presidential electors).
What should raise eyebrows, however, is that Bush v. Gore
has caused law professors who have canonized Baker to wail and
gnash their collective teeth. 5 If Baker was right, how can Bush
be wrong? Because the former reached a liberal result, and the
latter a conservative one? Such a nakedly political argument
simply will not do, especially if made by mainstream scholars,
who have steadfastly justified Warren Court decisions like Baker
as grounded in constitutional "law," not "politics." 6 For such intellectuals, consistency demands accepting the correctness of
both Baker and Bush. Conversely, those few conservative theoreticians who have condemned Baker as exemplifying Warren
Court activism cannot, in fairness, applaud Bush. Rather, they
must either swallow Baker or spit out Bush.

were abolished. See Gus Tyler, Court Versus Legislature, 27 L. & Contemp. Probs. 390,
395-98 (1962).
4. See infra notes 120-132 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part II.B (discussing this response).
6. See infra notes 51-71, 121-130 and accompanying text.
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For those of us who cling to the quaint notion that the Justices should apply rules of law rather than impose their political
preferences, however, the only coherent conclusion is that both
decisions were wrong. I will develop this thesis by examining
Baker and Bush in turn, then explaining why these two opinions
rested upon similarly faulty reasoning and cannot be materially
distinguished.
I. THE BAKER EARTHQUAKE AND ITS AFfERSHOCKS
A. LEGALBACKGROUND

Baker broke sharply with over a century of precedent. In
Luther v. Borden,7 the Court deferred to the previous determination of Congress and the President that Rhode Island's government satisfied Article IV, Section 4, which provides that "the
United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government." 8 Luther did not hold that all
complaints under this "Guarantee Clause" were nonjusticiable.
Most pertinently, the Court recognized the validity of Rhode Island's temporary declaration of martial law to meet threats to its
very existence, but declined "to inquire to what extent, [n]or under what circumstances, that power may be exercised by a State"

7. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
8. Id. at 42-45. The Rhode Island charter government, which had existed from
colonial times, declared martial law in the early 1840s to defeat a rebellious new government. Borden, a sheriff of the charter government, broke into the home of Luther, an
official of the new one. Luther claimed that Borden had lacked legal authority to act because the charter government violated the Republican Form of Government Clause. Id
at 34-38.
The Court held that this Clause did not empower it to decide this question, but
rather required deference to Congress's judgment that the charter government was the
legitimate one and hence "republican." Id. at 42. Moreover, as Congress had granted
the President sole discretion to decide when the militia was needed to quell an insurrection, and as he had exercised this power by recognizing the charter government, the
Court should yield to him. Id at 43-45.
In short, Luther's finding of nonjusticiability was limited to the situation where the
federal political branches had determined that one of two rival state governments was
valid. Id at 42-45. The Court thus acknowledged the significant, but not exclusive,
power of Congress and the President in ensuring each state a republican government.
Other cases treating claims under this Clause as political questions include Georgia
v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 71-77 (1867) (refusing to second-guess Congress's abolition of Georgia's government during Reconstruction); Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham,
178 U.S. 548 (1899) (holding nonjusticiable a complaint that Kentucky's resolution of a
contested election for governor deprived voters of a republican government); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 278-79 (1900) (avoiding the question of whether Congress must
establish republican governments in the territories before they become states).
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before a Guarantee Clause violation would occur. 9 This qualifier would make no sense if the Justices thought they never
could consider whether a state's actions ran afoul of that Clause.
Nonetheless, the Court imposed such an absolute politicalquestion bar in Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 10 which dismissed a corporation's claim that a state law passed by initiative
rather than statute rendered its government non-republican. 11
Moreover, the Court rejected the corporation's attempt to avoid
this result by asserting a separate cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment, callin~ this ploy a "superficial" elevation of
"form" over "substance." 1 Subsequent cases held all Republican Form of Government issues to be nonjusticiable. 13
Applying this precedent, the Court routinely rejected challenges to state apportionment schemes. 14 For instance, in Cole9. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 45.
10. 223 U.S. 118 (1912). The Court ignored numerous cases after Luther adjudicating Guarantee Clause claims. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 17576 (1874) (evaluating, but rejecting, the argument that a state's failure to grant its female
citizens the right to vote violated the Republican Form of Government Clause); In re
Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1891) (ruling that a state court's interpretation of a state
statute to ascertain whether it had been duly enacted did not violate this Clause); Forsyth
v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506,519 (1897) (holding that a state could, consistent with Section
4 of Article IV, leave the determination of the territorial boundaries of municipalities to
its courts rather than its legislature); Michigan ex rei. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239
(1905) (concluding that a state legislature did not render its government non-republican
by creating, altering, and dividing the property of school districts); South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U.S. 437, 454 (1905) (finding no violation under this Clause). The justiciability ban established in Pacific States lasted eighty years. See New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 184-85 (1992) (conceding that the Court had, since 1912, misinterpreted Luther and its progeny as prohibiting all Guarantee Clause claims).
For present purposes, the key point is that when Baker was decided in 1962, all the
Justices assumed that the Republican Form of Government Clause raised political rather
than judicial questions.
11. Pacific States, 223 U.S. at 142-51.
12. Id at 137, 139-40. A similar attempt to repackage a Guarantee Clause claim as
a Fourteenth Amendment one succeeded in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), as explained infra Part I. B.
13. See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 609-12 (1937) (involving a state legislative delegation to an agency of the power to set milk prices); Ohio ex
rei. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74,79 (1930) (dealing with a rule requiring that state statutes could not be invalidated absent the agreement of all but one state
court justice); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1916) (concerning a worker's compensation law); O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244,247-48 (1915) (involving a statutory delegation to the courts of the power to establish drainage districts); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1913) (pertaining to Indiana's constitutional
amendment procedure).
14. See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950) ("Federal courts consistently
refuse to exercise their equity powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's
geographical distribution of electoral strength among its political subdivisions."); Ohio ex
rei. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565,569-70 (1916) (holding nonjusticiable the claim that
the invalidation of a state reapportionment statute by referendum violated the Republi-
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grove v. Green/ 5 four of the seven participating Justices affirmed
the dismissal of a complaint alleging that an Illinois statute had
unconstitutionally established districts for congressional representatives that did not reflect population changes. In the principal opinion, Justice Frankfurter and two colleagues ruled that
"[v)iolation of the great guaranty of a republican form of government in States cannot be challenged in the courts." 16 Justice
Rutledge assumed the case to be justiciable, but concluded that
the district court had equitable discretion to decline to exercise
jurisdiction in light of the delicate relationship between Congress
and the states in determining congressional districts. 17
Many cases followed Colegrove in repelling constitutional
attacks on state electoral laws, usually based upon Justice Frankfurter's reasoning. 18 The lone exception to this political question
analysis arose when states racially discriminated in electoral matters, thereby violating individual and minority-group rights under the Fifteenth Amendment. 19
can Form of Government Clause).
15. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
16. ld. at 556.
17. Id at 564-66. Three dissenters saw no political question obstacle and would
have struck down the statute on equal protection grounds. ld. at 566-74 (Black, J., dissenting).
18. Although in Colegrove four of seven Justices found the matter justiciable, in
almost all the following cases the Court apparently assumed the opposite and issued oneline opinions that typically referenced Colegrove. See, e.g., Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S.
920 (1956) (per curiam) (involving the same Tennessee statute that would be disputed in
Baker); see also Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959) (per curiam); Radford v. Gary,
352 U.S. 991 (1957) (per curiam); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952) (per curiam);
Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952) (per curiam); Tedesco v. Bd. of Supervisors, 339
U.S. 940 (1950) (per curiam); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947) (per curiam);
Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (per curiam); cf. South, 339 U.S. at 277 (combining this "political question" approach with Justice Rutledge's "equitable discretion"
framework). In the single instance in which the Court exercised discretion to reach the
merits, it rejected the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from appropriately diffusing political initiative between its sparsely and densely populated counties. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948) (per curiam). See generally Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 252 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (noting that, regardless of Colegrove's actual holding, the Court had interpreted the decision as based upon the political
question doctrine and a refusal to countenance any possible Fourteenth Amendment
claim).
19. For example, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), struck down an Alabama statute which had redistricted a city in order to deprive blacks of their right to vote.
ld at 340-45. The Court distinguished this "singl[ing) out [ofj a readily isolated segment
of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment" from the political question presented in Colegrove, where the plaintiffs "complained only of a dilution of the strength of
their votes." Id at 346. Other cases finding similar Fifteenth Amendment violations included Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
The seminal case is Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (invalidating a state law
that facially discriminated on the basis of race).
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B. THE BAKER DECISION

In Baker v. Carr,Z0 urban Tennessee voters claimed that a
1901 statute apportioning legislative districts, which had not
been amended to account for the large population shift awax
from rural areas, had unconstitutionally debased their votes. 1
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan reinvented the
political question doctrine in two significant ways.
First, he asserted that "it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government,
and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which
gives rise to the 'political question."' 22 Hence, Justice Brennan
deemed this doctrine inapplicable because the Court was not
considering a question decided by a coequal government department, but rather "the consistency of state action with the
Federal Constitution." 23 He distinguished numerous cases holding to the contrary (such as Colegrove and its progeny, which
emphasized federalism concerns) as grounded upon limits on the
federal judiciary's equity power, not justiciability.24
Second, Justice Brennan declared that the presence of a political question could be determined only through a multi-factor
"case-by-case inquiry. "25 The most important considerations
were "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department" and "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it. ,26
Applying this new analysis, the Court conceded that the
voters' challenge, if made under the Guarantee Clause, would
have raised a political question. 27 Nonetheless, it held justiciable
the identical claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause. 28
Justice Brennan's entire substantive analysis of this provision
consisted of one sentence: "Judicial standards under the Equal
20. 369 u.s. 186 (1962).
21. Id at 187-95.
22. Id at 210.
23. Id at 226.
24. Id at 231-37.
25. Id at 211.
26. Id. at 217.
27. Id at 209-10,217-29.
28. Id at 208-37; see also id at 227-29 (concluding that the equal protection complaint was not so enmeshed with the Republican Form of ~~ve~e?t claim as to make
the question presented "political"). Although couched m JUnsdictiOnal language, the
majority's opinion clearly indicates its belief that the Tennessee apportionment statute
was unconstitutional, as subsequent decisions would confirm.
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Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has
been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must,
that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and
capricious action. "29
In his concurrence, Justice Clark lamented the majority's
decision to rest its ruling on jurisdictional grounds and its
"fail[ure] to give the District Court any guidance whatever. "30
Instead, he would have held on the merits that the apportionment statute violated equal protection because Tennessee did
not offer any "rational basis" for it. 31 Justice Clark stressed that
federal court adjudication was the only practical remedy because
other political channels were unavailable. 32 Finally, he argued
that the Court should have fashioned a specific remedy with a
rational districting plan, because otherwise the district judge
might simply declare a constitutional violation in the hope of
"blackjacking" the state legislature into acting. 33
In dissent, Justice Frankfurter assailed the majority for reversing the uniform precedent holding apportionment to be a
political question, like all Republican Form of Government
claims. 34 He emphasized the Court's traditional unwillingness to
interfere with state governments, absent violation of an explicit,
judicially enforceable constitutional command (such as the prohibition against racial discrimination). 35
Justice Frankfurter asserted that plaintiffs had tendered a
Guarantee Clause claim "masquerading under [the] different label"36 of an individual equal protection complaint that their
"right to vote and to have their votes counted" had been in-

29. Id at 226.
30. Id at 251 (Clark, J., concurring).
31. Id at 253-59.
32. As the entrenched rural legislators would not voluntarily change a districting
scheme that maximized their power by diluting the electoral strength of urban areas, the
ordinary political remedy of voting was ineffective. See id. at 259. Similarly, since only
the Assembly could initiate an amendment to the state Constitution, that route was
closed. Id. Moreover, Tennessee had no initiative or referendum procedure, and its
courts refused to consider the voters' claims. Id. Finally, Congress had not stepped in to
rectify the problem. Id.; see also id at 248-49 (Douglas, J., concurring) (deeming relief
through the political process "illusory").
33. Id. at 260 (Clark, J., concurring); see also id at 250-51 n.5 (Douglas, J., concurring) (agreeing that federal court rulings might induce legislatures to reapportion, but
viewing this prospect as beneficial).
34. Id. at 266-67,277-80, 289-97 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 267,284-86.
36. Id. at 297.
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fringed? 7 Regardless of label, however, apportionment involved
multiple policy factors-such as geography, demographics, socioeconomics, convenience, traditions, and mathematical formulas- which could properly be weighed only by state officials?8 In
Frankfurter's view, the Equal Protection Clause provided no
more judicial guidance to review such decisions than did the Republican Form of Government Clause. 39 Nothing in the Equal
Protection Clause (or any other constitutional provision) required states to base representation solely on population; indeed, no such principle was applied at the time of the Framing,
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, or thereafter. 40
Justice Frankfurter predicted that Baker would "add a virulent source of friction and tension in federal-state relations" 41 by
empowering federal judges "to devise what should constitute the
proper composition of the legislatures of the fifty States." 42 He
warned:
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the
Court's "judicial Power" not only presages the futility of judicial intervention in the essentially political conflict of forces
by which the relation between population and representation
has time out of mind been and now is determined. It may
well impair the Court's position as the ultimate organ of "the
supreme Law of the Land" in that vast range of legal problems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling, on which
this Court must pronounce.
The Court's authoritypossessed of neither the purse nor the sword- ultimately rests
on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such
feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements
and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements. 43

37. Id at 299. This "right to have their votes counted" language, which appears in
almost all the later apportionment cases, uncannily foreshadows Vice President Gore's
slogan in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), discussed infra notes 133-166 and accompanying text.
38. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 268-69,323-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
39. ld at 300-01, 322-23.
40. Id at 301-21; see also id. at 300 ("To find such a political conception legally enforceable in the broad and unspecific guarantee of equal protection is to rewrite the Constitution.").
41. Id at 324.
42. ld. at 269.
43. Id at 267; see also id at 270 (urging "a frank acknowledgment that there is not
under our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political mischief, for every undesirable exercise of legislative power").
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Finally, Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority for failing to
provide lower courts with any specific guidance for devising appropriate relief for alleged constitutional violations by states in
their apportionment statutes. 44
In a separate dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the Equal
Protection Clause (1) had never before been interpreted as requiring each vote to be given equal weight in choosing state legislatures,45 and (2) did not empower federal courts "to judge
whether this resolution of the State's internal political conflict
(distributing electoral units geographically rather than demographically) is desirable or undesirable, wise or unwise." 46 He denied the applicability of the equal protection bar against "arbitrary and capricious" classifications, noting that it might well be
reasonable for a state to promote agricultural interests by giving
them more electoral strength.47 Justice Harlan further pointed
out that the only pertinent constitutional limit on states-the
Guarantee Clause-did not fix any immutable representation
principle.48 Finally, he rejected the argument that the voters' inability to obtain political redress justified "the Court to stretch to
find some basis for judicial intervention:" 49
Those observers of the Court who see it primarily as the last
refuge for the correction of all inequality or injustice, no matter what its nature or source, will no doubt applaud this decision and its break with the past. Those who consider that continuing national respect for the Court's authority depends in
large measure upon its wise exercise of self-restraint and discipline in constitutional adjudication will view the decision
with deep concern.50

44. Id at 267-68, 327-28. He especially deplored the contention that federal judicial
remedies might be obviated "once the abstract constitutional right to have courts pass on
a state-wide system of electoral districting is recognized as a matter of judicial rhetoric,
because legislatures would heed the Court's admonition." Id at 269; see also id at 339
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (condemning, as an illegitimate use of Article III power, the notion that the mere assertion of jurisdiction would induce malapportioned states to
"quickly respond with appropriate political action").
45. Id at 332, 338-39 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id at 333 (stressing that the
Senate belied any broader claim that the Constitution requires representation to be
based exclusively on population).
46. Id. at 333; see also id. at 332 (counseling deference to "the judgment of state
legislatures and courts on matters of basically local concern").
47. Id at 334-36.
48. Id at 333-34.
49. Id. at 339.
50. Id at 339-40.
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C. THE AFTERMATH OF BAKER
1. The Immediate Scholarly Reaction
As Justice Harlan predicted, Baker produced a mixed response.51 On one side, Thomas Emerson, Charles Black, Robert
McKay, Louis Pollak and others praised the Court for intervening because it represented the only realistic hope for remedying
injustices in apportionment. 52 These scholars deemed population equality in electoral districts a fundamental constitutional
value, even if it had never before been recognized. 53 They denied the need for any "precise or absolute" standards under the
Equal Protection Clause and instead urged case-by-case doctrinal development. 54 To them, Baker "mark[ed] a momentous
51. In this Article, I focus on the long-ignored essays published shortly after Baker
and related apportionment decisions had been rendered, because that work is most relevant in drawing comparisons with the commentary that has been written in the immedi·
ate wake of Bush, described infra Part II.B. I do not purport to analyze all of the literature dealing with the constitutional law governing elections.
52. See Thomas I. Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 Yale L.J. 64,
79-80 (1962) (maintaining that federal courts alone possessed the independence to resolve this problem rationally, because malapportionment had blocked the majority's ability to change the law through ordinary democratic processes). For similar arguments, see
Charles L. Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v.
Green, 72 Yale L.J. 13, 14 (1962); Robert B. McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts:
Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 645, 647, 678-80 (1963); Louis
H. Pollak, Judicial Power and "The Politics of the People," 72 Yale L.J. 81, 88 (1962); see
also Carl A. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote,
One Value, 1964 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 2 ("[I]t is ... paradoxical for the advocates of judicial selflimitation to criticize the Court for helping to make majority nile effective, because the
case for self-restraint rests on the assumption that the Court is reviewing the legislative
acts of representatives who are put in office and can be turned out of office by a majority
of the people.").
53. See, e.g., Auerbach, 1964 S. Ct. Rev. at 22-23 (cited in note 52); see also Black,
72 Yale L.J. at 14-18 (cited in note 52) (decrying the notion that judicial wisdom in constitutional adjudication always requires self-restraint, especially where the critical right to
equal treatment in voting was at stake); Emerson, 72 Yale L.J. at 79 (cited in note 52)
(lauding the majority for "abruptly reversing the whole position of the Court on a vital
and fundamental issue," electoral fairness); McKay, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 650-51, 654, 67778, 681-82, 690-91, 694-95,705-06 (cited in note 52) (emphasizing that the Court's failure
to decide important constitutional issues may also weaken its prestige, and claiming that
apportionment clearly implicates the basic civil right of the franchise); Pollak, 72 Yale
L.J. at 82-83, 87-88 (cited in note 52) (asserting that the Court correctly rejected the idea
of judicial restraint embraced in Colegrove and its progeny, which had tolerated gross
inequities in apportionment).
54. See Black, 72 Yale L.J. at 17 (cited in note 52) (making this point and suggesting that federal courts determine the reasonableness of various departures from the ideal
of equality based on population, such as geographical.con~id~rations); id at 18 (characterizing constitutional law as "not merely a set of static pnnc1ples but a process, even a
quest"); Emerson, 72 Yale L.J. at 65, 70-74 (cited in note 52) (arguing that equal protection standards could only be worked out with great difficulty in common-law fashion, and
recommending that the Court treat as "invidious discrimination" any factors unrelated to
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step forward in utilizing law ... for the maintenance and invigoration of the democratic structure of our society and in the assumption of a positive role by the Supreme Court in that task." 55
On the other side, Alexander Bickel,56 Stanley Friedelbaum,57 Jerold Israel,58 Jo Desha Lucas,59 Robert McCloskey,60
Phil Neal,61 and Allan Sindler62 decried the Baker majority's failpopulation that unduly subordinate the basic right to vote, such as wealth-based classifications); McKay, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 650-51, 659-60, 664-65, 681-700 (cited in note 52)
(deeming case-by-case development both prudent and routine in constitutional law, and
endorsing an approach similar to that of Professors Black and Emerson).
55. Emerson, 72 Yale L.J. at 79 (cited in note 52); see also id at 64, 68, 79-80 (exalting the Court for promoting democratic ideals and procedures in election laws). For
similar sentiments, see Black, 72 Yale L.J. at 14-15 (cited in note 52); McKay, 61 Mich. L.
Rev. at 645-46,650-51 (cited in note 52); Pollak, 72 Yale L.J. at 82-83, 87-89 (cited in note
52).
56. Alexander M. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 Yale L.J. 39
(1962). Bickel conceded the legal validity of two aspects of Baker. First, the Constitution's grant to Congress of power to regulate elections, both federal (under Article I, Section 4) and state (under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments), should not be interpreted as foreclosing the exercise of Article III authority to review constitutional
challenges to the electoral process. Id at 39-40, 44 (illustrating this point by citing the
Court's intervention in electoral decisions based upon race, and noting that Colegrove
did not hold to the contrary); see also Black, 72 Yale L.J. at 21-22 (cited in note 52); Pollak, 72 Yale L.J. at 83-84 (cited in note 52). Second, Bickel admitted that possible difficulties in enforcing decrees did not justify declining jurisdiction. Bickel, 72 Yale L.J. at
40 (invoking Brown to support this proposition). Nonetheless, he concluded that a different problem warranted such abstention: The Court could not devise principled legal
standards to determine the validity of apportionment statutes. Id. at 40-45.
57. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and its Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 673 (1962) (recommending that federal courts, to preserve federalism, should abstain until states had the
opportunity to change their apportionment statutes through democratic processes (if
available) and state courts had reviewed their constitutionality).
58. Jerold Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The
Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 107 (1962) (questioning the Court's ability to
develop and apply workable equal protection principles).
59. Jo Desha Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative Government:
The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 711 (1963) (charging the majority with
imposing their political and moral views by twisting the Constitution's language, history,
and precedent).
60. Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term-Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 54 (1962) (arguing that the Court should limit judicial
review of state apportionment laws to the procedural inquiry of whether they had been
passed through open channels for expressing popular consent, rather than trying to develop and apply practical and apolitical substantive constitutional standards). This idea
received full development in John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard U. Press,
1980), discussed infra notes 120, 123-124 and accompanying text.
61. Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. 252, 253
(Baker featured "an abrupt reversal of position, unexplored and debatable substantive
principles, and the contemplation of remedies as novel as they are drastic.").
62. Allan P. Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How to "Sear the Conscience" of Legislators, 72
Yale L.J. 23, 28-38 (1962) (contending that Baker's suggestion that the Equal Protection
Clause required voting equality based exclusively upon population had no basis in law or
history).
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ure to specify any governing legal principles-and argued that
attempting to do so would be futile because every apportionment law had evolved through a complex political process that
balanced many factors. 63 Thus, state governments represented
not only individuals but also competing interest groups through
mechanisms like bicameralism and geographical districting (often via existing subdivisions such as counties), which reflected
considerations both socioeconomic (e.g., a desire to ensure representation for minority groups) and political (e.g., the wish to
maintain a viable two-party system). 64 Accordingly, these critics
argued that neither our general constitutional traditions nor the
specific language, history, or precedent of the Equal Protection
Clause justified a simplistic apportionment standard of "rationality" based upon numerical equality of population. 65 Indeed, they
noted that it was precisely this inability to formulate and apply
workable constitutional principles, as well as federalism concerns, that had always led the Court to refuse to interfere with
state electoral matters based on general allegations of unfairness
or unreasonableness. 66
63. See Bickel, 72 Yale L.J. at 42-45 (cited in note 56); Friedelbaum, 29 U. Chi. L.
Rev. at 692-93,698 (cited in note 57); Israel, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 108-13 (cited in note 58);
Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 750-51, 756, 764-73 (cited in note 59); McCloskey, 76 Harv. L.
Rev. at 55, 63, 71-73 (cited in note 60); Neal, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. at 253, 267, 274, 284-86,
289-90 (cited in note 61); Sindler, 72 Yale L.J. at 30 (cited in note 62).
64. For elaborations of this theme, see Bickel, 72 Yale L.J. at 40-43 (cited in note
56); Israel, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 124, 130-34 (cited in note 58); Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at
764-76 (cited in note 59); McCloskey, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 71-73 (cited in note 60); Neal,
1962 S. Ct. Rev. at 275-83 (cited in note 61); Sindler, 72 Yale L.J. at 29-30, 38 (cited in
note 62).
65. "(J)udicial adherence to the single standard of equal-population representation
would constitute an arbitrary choice justified neither by law, nor history, nor logic." Sindler, 72 Yale L.J. at 33 (cited in note 62). For similar conclusions, see Bickel, 72 Yale L.J.
at 40-41 (cited in note 56); Israel, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 130-34 (cited in note 58); Lucas, 61
Mich. L. Rev. at 769-75, 802-04 (cited in note 59); McOoskey, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 71-73
(cited in note 60); Neal, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. at 275,279-80,284-86,326 (cited in note 61).
66. See, e.g., Friedelbaum, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 673-88,691 (cited in note 57) (arguing that Baker should have been controlled by the fifteen apportionment decisions over
the previous thirty years, all of which had dismissed constitutional challenges). Professor
Lucas demonstrated that Justice Brennan's attempt to distinguish these cases was inaccurate and misleading. Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 711-48, 751-52, 803 (cited in note 59).
Recognizing that the Court had reached the merits in a few of these decisions, however,
he conceded that legislative districting did not necessarily fall outside federal jurisdiction
or raise political questions. Id. at 713-14. Nonetheless, Lucas concluded that prior judicial rulings that apportionment raised "nonjusticiable" issues under the Guarantee
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment actually reflected substantive determinations
that those constitutional provisions did not confer individual legal rights. Id at 754-55;
see also Israel, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 136-37, 143 (cited in note 58) (asserting that any
claims of unfairness in apportionment really implicated whether the state had a republican form of government and therefore were political questions); cf. Arthur Earl Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Govern-
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These scholars acknowledged that Baker had proved very
popular, especially because Americans had become overwhelmingly non-rural. 67 Nonetheless, they warned that the majority's
refusal to adhere to legal rules and precedent, and their imposition of their personal notions of fairness and their political
agenda of reform, would eventually weaken the Court's authority and independence. 68 For instance, Robert McCloskey characterized Baker as political fiat and admonished federal judges to
exercise a recognizably "judicial" function-formulating and
consistently applying principles rooted in the Constitution's language, history, and precedent. 69 He argued that public confidence in the Court
depends heavily on the idea that what judicial review adds to
the governmental process is significantly different from what
the political branches contribute. We need not pause now to
inquire whether or to what degree this idea may be delusion;
delusion or not, the idea is vital to the Court's position as "the
ultimate organ of 'the supreme Law of the Land."' If the public should ever become convinced that the Court is merely
another legislature, that judicial review is only a euphemism
for an additional layer in the legislative process, the Court's
future as a constitutional tribunal would be cast in grave
doubt. ... [A] price is paid for each judicial venture into uncharted and unchartable seas. . . . Each such venture tarnishes
a little more the idea that the judicial process and the legisla-

ment, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 245 (1962) (arguing that this Clause was justiciable and required, at
a minimum, that legislatures have at least one chamber selected according to population
equality, with the other house permitted to reflect factors such as geography but not
wealth distinctions).
67. See, e.g., Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 803-04 (cited in note 59); but see Auerbach,
1964 S. Ct. Rev. at 70-71 (cited in note 52) (suggesting that voting interests did not divide
neatly into "rural" and "urban" blocs). Others attributed the spirit of compliance with
Baker as reflecting the Court's articulation of a widely shared ideal. See, e.g.,
McCloskey, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 58-59 (cited in note 60); Emerson, 72 Yale L.J. at 76, 78
(cited in note 52); McKay, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 645-46 (cited in note 52).
68. See, e.g., Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 801-04 (cited in note 59); Neal, 1962 S. Ct.
Rev. at 252-53, 274,326-27 (cited in note 61). In urging the Court to stay out of partisan
political struggles such as apportionment, Professor Lucas asked: "When courts undertake to manipulate and control the processes for selection of the politician, what is more
natural than for the politician to marshal his resources for controlling the selection of the
judge?" Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 802 (cited in note 59). Bush v. Gore raises that same
question.
69. McCloskey, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 67-73 (cited in note 60); see also Neal, 1962 S.
Ct. Rev. at 327 (cited in note 61) (concluding that Baker exemplifies "the role of fiat in
the exercise of judicial power" because the Court refused to explain its authority to act,
the propriety of its involvement in the political arena of apportionment, or its governing
legal principles).
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tive process are distinguishable .... [which] is indispensable to
judicial review. 70

Interestingly, commentators of all political and ideological
stripes predicted that the Court could not possibly mandate
equal population as the representation standard. 71 The Justices,
of course, took precisely that tack.
2. Baker Entrenched
The Court swiftly transformed Baker's jurisdictional ruling
into new substantive constitutional law. In 1963, Gray v. Sanders72 struck down Georgia's county-unit method of weighing
votes in Democratic primary elections for United States Senator
and statewide offices, which gave rural areas disproportionate
influence. 73 After quickly dismissing justiciability concerns,74 the
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that, once
a geographical unit for representation had been designated, all
those who participated in the election must have an equal vote. 75
Indeed, this principle assertedly resonated throughout American
history: "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean
only one thing-one person, one vote." 76
70. McCloskey, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 67 (cited in note 60).
71. See, e.g., id at 73 (arguing that the Court should not "undertake a Lochneresque responsibility for defining the substantive constitutional norm (e.g., 'one man, one
vote') and for determining whether each departure from the norm is 'rational' or 'capricious'"). For similar concerns about the infeasability of such a rigid standard, see Bickel,
72 Yale L.J. at 40-42 (cited in note 56); Black, 72 Yale L.J. at 17 (cited in note 52); Emerson, 72 Yale L.J. at 71-73 (cited in note 52); Israel, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 130-34 (cited in
note 58); Lucas, 61 Mich. L. Rev. at 769-75, 802-04 (cited in note 59); Sindler, 72 Yale
L.J. at 29-33 (cited in note 62); see also Paul A. Freund, New Vistas in Constitutional
Law, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 631, 638-39 (1964) (supporting the Baker Court's intervention
because Tennessee's political process could not resolve the problem, but criticizing "a
simplistic criterion of one man, one vote .... [as] question-begging in the case of a collegial body to be chosen with a view to balanced representation").
72. 372 u.s. 368 (1963).
73. Id at 370-72, 379. Each citizen's vote counted less and less as the population of
his county increased; thus, a combination of units from the smallest rural districts gave
counties having one-third of the total population a clear majority of the county votes. Id
at 372.
74. First, the Court found that the plaintiff, a Georgia voter, had standing to sue
because his right to vote had been impaired. Id at 375. Second, even though the state
Democratic Committee had voted to hold the 1962 primary election on a popular-vote
basis, the case was not moot because the law allowed Georgia to revert to the county-unit
system. Id. at 375-76.
75. Id. at 379-80.
76. Id. at 381.
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But Americans had never accepted this notion of "political
equality," as Justice Harlan explained. 77 Indeed, he contended
that the Electoral College refuted any such argument and that
the state's use of similar voting mechanisms could hardly be
deemed "irrational" under the Equal Protection Clause. 78
Moreover, Justice Harlan emphasized that the Court had rejected four previous constitutional challenges to Georgia's system.79 Finally, he lamented the Court's continuing entanglement
in politics, contrary to its hope in Baker that states would restructure their electoral systems without the need for further judicial intervention. 80
Downplaying such concerns, the Court in Wesberry v. Sanders81 held that a Georgia law creating single-member congressional districts with unequal populations violated Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he
House of Representatives shall be ... chosen ... by the People
of the several States." 82 The majority interpreted this language
as "mean[ing] that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. "83
The Court's historical justification for this principle rested on the
Convention's decision to apportion Representatives "among the
several States ... according to their respective Numbers" (embodied in Article I, § 2, Clause 3) and to ensure their election
"by the People. "84
77. Id. at 384 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78. ld at 384-85; see also id. at 388 (documenting that any disparities in the Georgia
system were akin to those in the Electoral College). As in Baker, a state could reasonably grant disproportionately more seats to agricultural than to urban communities, and
the Court's decision to judge constitutional rationality based on "pure arithmetic" was
"judicial fiat." Id at 386-88. The majority rejected the analogy to the Electoral College
on the ground that the Constitution explicitly authorized its numerical inequality to address specific historical concerns. Id. at 378.
79. See id at 383 (citing Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); South v. Peters,
339 U.S. 276 (1950); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916
(1958)). Although these four decisions were short per curiam dismissals, the Court had
given plenary consideration to the same constitutional attack on an Illinois law in MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948). See Gray, 372 U.S. at 385 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80. Gray, 372 U.S. at 382, 388-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
81. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
82. Id at 7-18.
83. ld at 7-8.
84. ld at 11-15. These provisions reflected the wishes of the large states, whereas
the Senate-composed of two members from each state elected by their legislaturessatisfied the small states. See id at 11-13 (discussing this "Great Compromise"). The
Court also cited various historical statements that the House had to reflect the proportionate populations of the states to support the (quite different) proposition that, within
each state, there had to be equal representation for equal numbers of people. See id. at
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Justice Harlan, however, asserted that the language of Article I and its relevant history were "all in strong and consistent
direct contradiction of the Court's holding. "85 First of all, he
faulted the majority for focusing exclusively on the "chosen by
the People" phrase and ignoring the rest of Clause 1, which confers the right to vote for Representatives only on those people
whom "the State has found qualified to vote for members of ...
the State Legislature." 86 Indeed, every state since 1789 had set
qualifications for voting (e.g., property ownership), just as the
Framers intended. 87
Furthermore, Justice Harlan pointed out that Section 2,
Clause 3 simply provides for apportionment of Representatives
"among the several States" based on their populations, but does
not deal with how Representatives would be chosen within each
state. 88 Finally, he emphasized that the only constitutional provision that covers districting within a state is Section 4 of Article I:
"The Times, Places, and Manner of holding [congressional] Elections . . . shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations." 89 By Justice Harlan's lights, Section 4 placed
no restrictions on this power and did not mention-much less
mandate-equal representation in districting. 90 In fact, he
showed that the entire history of the drafting, ratification, and
implementation of Section 4 revealed that only Congress-not
federal courts-had authority to review the states' exercise of
their power to select their Representatives according to any
method of popular election they chose. 91 Justice Harlan accused
8-18.
85. lei at 41-42 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. ld. at 25.
87. ld. at 25-27 n.7; see also iei at 30-31 (demonstrating that even those Convention
delegates who favored representation based on population thought that only propertied
citizens should vote). Thus, Section 2 itself could not possibly prevent a state from apportioning Representatives as it pleased. See id. at 26.
88. ld. at 27; see also id. at 31-32 (establishing that the Convention debates on this
clause exclusively concerned how Representatives should be apportioned among, not
within, the states). Moreover, even among the states, the Framers did not endorse absolute numerical equality, as shown by two provisions in Clause 3. One guaranteed each
state a Representative regardless of population. ld. at 28-29 (illustrating this point by
noting that sparsely populated states like Wyoming have one Representative, even
though their population is significantly Jess than that of the average congressional district
within other states). The second provision counted three-fifths of slaves in their state's
representation, thereby giving Southern states representation far in excess of their voting
population. lei at 27.
89. ld. at 29.
90. ld. at 29-30.
91. Id. at 23-24, 29-30, 32-42 (citing uncontested statements by Madison, Wilson,
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his colleagues of substituting their judgment about sound political principles for that of Congress, thereby upsetting the constitutional separation of powers.92 He asserted that the Justices
had weakened the political process by imposing their political
theory of selecting Representatives on the states and Congress
"for no reason other than that it seems wise to the majority of
the present Court. "93
Justice Harlan concluded that (1) all the historical evidence
confirmed his straightforward interpretation of Article I, and (2)
no one had ever before suggested that Section 2's "by the People" language created a "one person, one vote" principle that restricted the Section 4 power of either the states or Congress.94
Hence, he alleged that "[t]he constitutional right which the
Court create[d] [was] manufactured out of whole cloth. "95
Although Justice Stewart believed that Harlan had "unanswerably demonstrated" the incorrectness of Wesberry's holding,96 the Court quickly extended it to state legislatures in Reynolds v. Sims. 97 After finding justiciable a challenge by Alabama
voters to the malapportionment of their legislature98 and determining that they had no effective political remedy ,99 the Court
declared: "the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state

Hamilton, and others). Congress had always exercised plenary power to supervise state
laws governing the manner of congressional elections. As the Court had previously recognized, in 1929 Congress deleted-and repeatedly refused to reinstate-its 1872 statutory provision requiring that Representatives "be elected by districts ... containing as
nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants." Id at 42-44 (citing relevant
precedent and legislation).
Despite this evidence, the majority held that Section 4 did not immunize state or
congressional apportionment decisions from judicial review. ld at 5-7 (citing Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186,232 (1962)).
92. See id at 22, 48 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
93. ld at 30; see also id at 48 (emphasizing that reliance on the Court to spearhead
political reform would weaken the political process).
94. ld. at 30-42.
95. ld at 42 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
96. Id at 50-51 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Harlan's substantive
analysis of Article I, but deeming the case justiciable).
97. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
98. ld at 537-59. Congress's admission into the Union of states with apportionment
plans not based on population (and thus its judgment that such states had a Republican
Form of Government) did not prevent the Court from determining whether such
schemes violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id at 582.
99. The Court undercut its own conclusion by conceding that Alabama (unlike
Tennessee) had a constitutional amendment process, and that indeed its voters had rejected an amendment proposing greater representation in one legislative house based
upon population. Id. at 553-54, 570.
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legislators." 100 Accordingly, representation in both houses had
to be based on population, not place of residence, geography,
economic interests, or historical practice. 101 The Court distinguished the Constitution's congressional system of representation as reflecting an essential compromise among sovereign
states-a unique circumstance without relevance to state legislative districting schemes. 102 Borrowing Wesberry's "as nearly as is
practicable" qualifier, however, the Court announced it would
permit minor deviations from the equal-population principle
when incidental to effectuating a rational state policy, such as
ensuring some voice to political subdivisions (but not geographical considerations alone, economic interests, or historical patterns).103
Justices Clark and Stewart, concurring, would have held
that Alabama's sixty-year old apportionment plan was plainly
irrational under the Equal Protection Clause. 104 They faulted the
majority for elaborating legal standards based on "meaningless
phrases. " 105
In a five-part argument, Justice Harlan assailed the Court
for spouting "generalities" that totally ignored the Fourteenth
Amendment's language, drafting and ratification process, implementing history, and precedent. 106 First, the Court's interpretation of the phrase "equal protection" in Section 1 (the lone
provision it considered) was refuted by Section 2, which explicitly recognized the states' power to "deny" or "abridge" the right

100. Id at 566.
101. Id at 561-76; see also id at 568 (arguing that "equal protection" meant "substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens" because legislators represented people, not areas or group interests).
102. Id at 571-75.
103. Id at 577-81.
104. See id. at 587-88 (Clark, J., concurring); id at 588-89 (Stewart, J., concurring).
105. See, e.g., id at 587-88 (Clark, J., concurring) ("Whether 'nearly as is practicable'
means 'one person, one vote' qualified by 'approximately equal' or 'some deviations' or
by the impossibility of 'mathematical nicety' is not clear from the majority's use of these
vague and meaningless phrases."); see also id at 588-89 (Stewart, J., concurring).
In a companion case, both of these Justices (along with Harlan) dissented from the
majority's invalidation of Colorado's apportionment law because that state had ensured
equality in its House and had rationally based representation in its Senate on a combination of factors such as population, its mountainous geography, and economic considerations. Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 741-44 (1964) (Clark, J., dissenting); id at 744-65 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
106. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589-625 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending that this evidence demonstrated that states (1) could choose any method they wished for apportioning their legislatures and (2) did not have to ensure that all legislators represented substantially the same number of people).
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to vote. 107 Second, the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment revealed Congress's deliberate refusal to impose
any limits on the states' exclusive and plenary power over voting
rights (including legislative apportionment), because attempting
to do so would have jeopardized adoption of the Amendment. 108
All the ratifying states also shared this understanding. 109 Third,
after 1868 states routinely exercised their independent power to
structure their legislatures as they saw fit, 110 and as of 1964 the
constitutions of eighty percent of the states recognized bases of
apportionment other than population. 111 Fourth, the Fifteenth
and Nineteenth Amendments, which prohibited abridgement of
the right to suffrage on account of race and gender, would have
been unnecessary if the Fourteenth Amendment already protected equality in voting. 112 Finally, the Court had silently overruled its pertinent pre-Baker cases, which had uniformly held
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer the right either
to vote or to a state legislature apportioned by population. 113
Justice Harlan contended that the majority was amending
the Constitution by adding something that had been deliberately
excluded, not applying general constitutional language to a situation that had not been contemplated.U 4 Thus, he claimed that, as
in Baker, Gray, and Wesberry, the Court had exceeded its Article III authority by imposing its own notions of reform because
of its impatience with the political processOU 5 Moreover, these
apportionment cases sanctioned intolerable interference with the

107. ld at 593-94 (noting that Section 2 also set forth a remedy if a state exercised
this power: reducing that state's basis of representation proportionately to those excluded).
108. Id at 595-99 (showing that every Congressman who spoke on this issue held this
view).
109. First, most of the "loyal" ratifying states had constitutions that allowed apportionment in at least one legislative chamber to be based on factors other than population,
and they certainly did not think that ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment voided
their own constitutions. Id at 602-04. Second, Congress demanded that the ten "reconstructed" states ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and readmitted those states even
though their constitutions usually departed from the "equal representation" principle.
Id at 604-07.
110. Id at 608-10.
Ill. Id at 610-11.
112. Id. at 611-12.
113. Id at 612-14 (citing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947)).
114. ld at 590-91, 608, 625. Therefore, the Court's decision "cannot be excused or
explained by any concept of 'developing' constitutionalism. It is meaningless to speak of
constJtutwnal 'development' when both the language and history of the controlling proVISIOns of the ConstitutiOn are wholly ignored." Id at 591.
115. Id. at 615, 624-25.
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states by "placing basic aspects of state political systems under
the pervasive over lordship of the federal judiciary. " 116
These decisions ... cut deeply into the fabric of our federalism.... [T)he aftermath of these cases, however desirable it
may be thought in itself, will have been achieved at the cost of
a radical alteration in the relationship between the States and
the Federal Government, more particularly the Federal Judiciary.117

3. A Summary of the Apportionment Cases
Baker and Reynolds created an equal protection requirement that state legislatures be apportioned according to equality
of population. The Court in Gray applied that rule to state representation schemes for federal Senate elections, and in Wesberry discovered the identical principle in the Article I provisions governing congressional districting. 118 Justice Harlan
argued, however, that these holdings lacked any foundation in
the Constitution's words, history, or precedent and subverted the
traditional understanding of the judiciary's proper role in the
federal system. 119

116. ld. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id at 615-22 (describing how federal
district courts were pressuring state legislatures to reapportion hastily according to stan·
dardless political judgments that judges were incompetent to make).
117. See id at 624 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Samuel Issacharoff, et al., When
Elections Go Bad: The Law of Democracy and the Presidential Election of 2000 at 45-46
(Foundation Press, 2001) (describing Reynolds as "one of the most dramatically destabilizing decisions in the Court's history .... [r]equir[ing] the massive and immediate restructuring of virtually every State legislature in the country"); but see Auerbach, 1964 S.
Ct. Rev. at 72-73 (cited in note 52) (arguing that malapportionment also adversely affects
the federal system by skewing the political parties' selection of congressional candidates
and national convention delegates, by creating "safe" districts that reinforce Congress's
seniority system, and by forcing the federal government to deal directly with cities because states do not effectively represent their interests).
118. Developed in the context of drawing legislative districts, the principle that all
voters must have an equal opportunity to participate in elections was swiftly extended to
qualifications for exercising the franchise. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663,665-70 (1966) (striking down a state's attempt to impose wealth-based classifications for voting such as poll taxes).
119. See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress:
Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 209 (1964) (largely
agreeing with Justice Harlan and contending that the Court's exclusive focus on the numerical equality of each individual vote ignored that representation also involves interest
groups and political parties); see also Issacharoff, et al., When Elections Go Bad at 46
(cited in note 117) ("[T]he [apportionment] decisions held that the original constitutional
structures had to be synthesized with emerging conceptions of democracy that required
political equality among all voters, a conception that the Court read back into the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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Despite its shaky constitutional underpinnings, the Court's
"one person, one vote" slogan had broad popular appeal. 120
Within a few years the validity of Baker became widely accepted, even among scholars who had initially attacked it. 121
Baker and its progeny still lacked any coherent intellectual
foundation, however. 122
4. Baker Rationalized, Sanitized, and Lionized
Baker remained a result in search of a rationale until John
Hart Ely published his influential thesis that judicial review in a
democracy should be limited to situations where representative
government cannot be trusted because of failures in the political
process. 123 Hence, Professor Ely endorsed the Baker line of
cases because "they involve[ d) rights (1) that are essential to the
democratic process and (2) whose dimensions cannot safely be
left to our elected representatives, who have an obvious vested
interest in the status quo." 124
With rare exceptions, 125 writers after Ely have accepted
Baker's correctness and wisdom. 126 Indeed, prominent scholars
120. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 121 (cited in note 60); see also supra note 67
and accompanying text (describing the popularity of Baker). When the Court enters the
political fray, it not surprisingly uses catchy political sound-bites that are easy to understand, like "one person, one vote" or "the right to choose."
121. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate
Premises, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 986, 991 (1967) ("At least some of us who shook our heads
over Baker v. Carr are prepared to admit ... that it has not impaired, indeed that it has
enhanced, the prestige of the Court.").
122. An early attempt to build one was William P. Irwin, Representation and Election: The Reapponionment Cases in Retrospect, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 729 (1969) (arguing that
the Court's adoption of an "equal population" standard (1) created a free market for interest representation by eliminating statutory biases favoring particular interests (such as
farmers and the wealthy), and (2) avoided difficult political questions regarding how legislatures behaved in reconciling various interests).
123. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 73-183 (cited in note 60). Thus, federal courts
should correct problems in the process of representation to ensure that ordinary political
channels of change remain open, rather than second-guess the content of the political
choices made. Id.
124. Id. at 117. In fairness to the Court, it did mention in Baker that one impetus for
its intervention was the unavailability of ordinary political remedies to resolve the
malapportionment. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (citing the concurring
opinions of Justices Clark and Douglas). Nonetheless, the majority did not rest their decision on that fact, but rather on the justiciability of a "vote debasement" claim under the
Equal Protection Clause. And the Warren Court certainly did not follow Professor Ely's
corollary that the Justices should not disturb substantive policy determinations made by
political officials elected and operating in an open democratic process.
125. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec and Stephen B. Presser, The American Constitutional Order: History, Cases, and Philosophy 1288-89 (Anderson Publishing Co., 1998)
(questioning the Baker Court's abandonment of judicial restraint and its refusal to grant
states the same political latitude as Congress in having one legislative chamber based on
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have expended considerable energy in developing theories to
justify Baker and other Warren Court decisions as grounded in
constitutional law, not merely liberal politics. 127 For instance,
Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that the Warren Court illustrates
the proper judicial role: to interpret the Constitution authoritatively by exercising discretion, informed by the Justices' moral
sensibilities, to give specific meaning to the Constitution's abstract language-an indeterminate, evolutionary, and openended process that strives to identify and preserve society's fundamental values. 128 He praises Baker as exemplifying this pronon-population interests); Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev.
637, 639-40 (2001) (arguing that Baker "evaded the political question straitjacket ... by
denying the applicability of a truncated version of the political question doctrine and by
invoking curiously assumed 'judicial standards that are well developed and familiar,"' but
that the Court never cogently explained either its discarding of this doctrine or how
judges could avoid entangling themselves in political disputes); Michael McConnell, The
Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 Harv. J. L. & Pub.
Pol. 103 (2000) (asserting that Baker and its progeny adopted a mathematically precise
"equal population" principle that had no basis in the text or history of the Equal Protection Clause or in the Constitution's structure, and that application of this rule has had the
practical effect of allowing entrenched partisan politicians to gerrymander favorable districts).
126. The leading constitutional law treatises and casebooks simply summarize Baker,
without seriously challenging it. See, e.g., William Cohen and Jonathan D. Varat, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 103-05 (Foundation Press, 11th ed. 2001); Gerald Gunther and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 46-54 (Foundation Press, 13th ed.
1997); Jesse H. Choper, et al., Constitutional Law: Cases-Comments-Questions 36-38
(West Publishing Co., 9th ed. 2001); Ronald Rotunda and John E. Nowak, 1 Treatise on
Constitutional Law 314, 564-65 (West Group, 3d ed. 1999); 3 Treatise on Constitutional
Law at 740-41; Geoffrey R. Stone, eta!., Constitutional Law 112, 120, 123-33, 748 (Little
Brown & Co., 4th ed. 2001). Baker's "landmark" status has often been duly noted. See
Laurence Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law 371-72 (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2000);
see also Paul Brest, et al., Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials 733 (Aspen Law & Business, 4th ed. 2000) (deeming Baker "canonical").
127. For example, Professor Sunstein declares: "[T]he Constitution is law. If the
Constitution is law, then it stands above politics. All public officials-whether Democratic, Republican, or something else-must obey. The Constitution does not mean what
particular people want it to mean; otherwise it would not be law at all." Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 93 (Harvard U. Press, 1993). But he then adds that "the
Constitution is often extremely vague" and that "[r]easonable people disagree about
what it means." Id Sunstein praises the (presumably "reasonable") interpretations of
the Warren Court as promoting constitutional "ideals" such as equality in voting, privacy
rights, religious liberty, and freedom from discrimination. Id at 98, 260. See also Robert
C. Post, Justice William J. Brennan and the Warren Court, 8 Canst. Comm. 11, 14 (1991)
(citing Baker as "exemplary of the Warren Court's jurisprudence" in reconstructing constitutional law on the basis of individualism and democracy).
128. Erwin Chemerinsky, Interpreting the Constitution 45-141 (Praeger, 1987). The
Warren Court embodies Chemerinsky's ideal:
[O]nly a constitution that evolves by interpretatio~ .can ~dequately protect minorities and safeguard fundamental nghts. A JUdiciary msulated from the political process is uniquely suited to articulate society's deepest values and apply
them to protect interests and groups most m need of assistance. The powerful
in society can succeed in the legislature, but the powerless and unpopular need
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gressive, nonoriginalist approach: "The reapportionment of state
legislatures would not have occurred without judicial action, and
the Court's enforcement of a 'one person/one vote' rule has
made state legislatures much more responsive and effective in
dealing with urban problems." 129
Chemerinsky's assessment of Baker expresses the mainstream academic view. Indeed, as Professors Balkin and Levinson have noted, the case has become part of a "constitutional
canon" that is immune from serious scholarly questioningY0
Moreover, federal judicial forays into electoral matters have
become so routine that they attract little controversy. For example, in 1992 the Court relied upon Baker and Wesberry in
unanimously permitting a challenge to Congress's selection of a
method for apportionment of congressional districts among
states under Article I, Section 2. 131
The lesson of Baker, then, seems plain. When a majority of
the Justices perceive a nationwide electoral crisis that admits of
no easy political solution, they should resolve it by making up
new equal protection law and by ignoring principles of justiciability, federalism, and stare decisis. Dissenting colleagues and
commentators may warn that such flagrant political interference
will undermine the Court's independence and prestige, but such

judicial protection. The Warren Court's legacy is a lesson of the benefits that
can result from judicial discretion. No other institution but the Court would
have desegregated the South ... reapportioned state legislatures ... [and] had
the courage to uphold the right to reproductive autonomy.
ld at 127.
129. Id at 141. Reaching "progressive" policy results apparently outweighs the legal
shortcomings of Baker that Chemerinsky has identified elsewhere. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 119, 125 (Aspen Law & Business, 1997)
(contending that Justice Brennan's six-factor test for determining political questions was
"useless" and that he drew "a fatuous distinction" that apportionment was justiciable
under the Equal Protection Clause but not the Guarantee Clause).
130. Liberal law professors have placed "the beloved precedents of the beloved
Warren Court" in a "constitutional canon," so that no respectable theorist can dare suggest that these cases might be normatively incorrect. See J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 964, 997-1002 (1998). They
note the "irony" that "it is liberals who defend the [legal] academic theory canon against
the 'barbarians' on the right," because in every other discipline liberal pragmatists argue
that "all knowledge is revisable if good enough reasons can be provided." Id at 998.
131. Dept. of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442,456-59 (1992). In the special context of gerrymandering designed to enhance the voting clout of African Americans, however, a few Justices have resurrected the Frankfurter/Harlan argument that the Court
should abstain from second-guessing states' choices in balancing competing political interests in their districting plans. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,918-25 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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dire predictions will prove groundless. Against this background,
Bush v. Gore 132 seems not only plausible but inevitable.
II. BUSH v. GORE AND ITS FALLOUT
A. THECASE
Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore protested Florida's determination that Republican George Bush had won its 25
electoral votes. Gore requested a manual recount in MiamiDade, Palm Beach, Broward, and Volusia Counties. 133 Overruling the Florida Secretary of State's order that such recounts had
to be completed by the statutory deadline of November 14, that
state's supreme court granted a twelve-day extension. 134 Because of uncertainty over the grounds of that decision, the
United States Supreme Court vacated. 135
On November 26, Florida's Elections Commission certified
Bush the winner. 136 Gore contested this certification under a
statute that required him to prove a "rejection of a number of
legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the
election. " 137 Reversing a trial judge's ruling that Gore had failed
to meet this burden, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted "legal vote" to mean one that expressed a "clear indication of the
intent of the voter" 138 and ordered (1) a hand recount of 9000
Miami-Dade ballots with "undervotes" (i.e., those with no machine-detected vote), (2) inclusion of Miami-Dade's partial
manual recount, which yielded 168 Gore votes, and (3) the addition of 215 Gore votes from Palm Beach County, even though
these results had been submitted after the court's own November 26 deadline. 139 Seven U.S. Supreme Court Justices concluded that this order violated the Equal Protection Clause by
allowing "standardless manual recounts. " 140

132. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
133. Id. at 101.
134. Id
135. Id The Florida high court reinstated its judgment on December 11. Id
136. Id.
137. Id., citing Fla. Stat. Ann. § 102.168(3)(c).
138. Id at 102.
139. Id.
140. Id at 529. Two Justices agreed with this equal protection holding, but would
have declined to exercise jurisdiction in the first place. See id at 129, 134 (Souter, J., dissenting); id at 551 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Five Justices joined a per curiam opinion. Initially, they reaffirmed an 1892 case that had construed Article II, Section 1 of
the Constitution, which provides that " [e ]ach State shall appoint
[presidential electors] in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct," 141 as a grant of plenary authority. 142 If a state legislature chose to exercise that appointment power by authorizing
its citizens to vote, then under Reynolds the Equal Protection
Clause gave them a fundamental right which could not be violated by arbitrary or disparate action that valued one person's
vote over another's. 143
The majority held that Florida's Supreme Court had committed precisely this violation by failing to specify uniform rules
to be apglied in determining the general statutory "intent of the
voter."
For instance, the state court included recounts from
three counties that had used divergent standards, contrary to
Gray's holding that states cannot disparately treat voters in different counties. 145 In fact, "the standards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots might vary not only from county to county
but indeed within a single county from one recount team to another."146 For example, in Miami-Dade three canvassing board
members applied three different criteria in defining a legal
vote. 147 Even more troubling was the Palm Beach County board,
which
changed its evaluative standards during the counting process.
[It] began ... with a 1990 guideline which precluded counting
completely attached chads, switched to a rule that considered
a vote to be legal if any light could be seen through a chad,
changed back to the 1990 rule, and then abandoned any pre-

141. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 1, cl. 2.
142 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35
(1892)).
143. ld at 104-05 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964), discussed supra
notes 97-117 and accompanying text).
144. Id at 105-06. Although a state may allow local entities to "develop different
systems for implementing elections," here a state court with power to establish uniform
standards ordered a recount but did not ensure equal treatment. Id at 109. To illustrate,
recounts in three counties extended to all ballots, not just "undervotes." Id at 107. Another example was the Florida Supreme Court's allowing partial recount totals from Miami-Dade County but complete totals from others. Id at 107-08. Moreover, the ad hoc
counting teams lacked training in handling and interpreting ballots, and observers were
prohibited from objecting during the recount. Id at 109.
145. ld at 107 (citing, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), discussed supra
notes 72-80 and accompanying text).
146. ld. at 106.
147. ld
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tense of a per se rule, only to have a court order that the
county consider dimpled chads legal. 148

Turning to the remedy, the majority declined to remand for a
constitutionally proper contest because Florida's Legislature had
mandated that any contest be completed by December 12-the
date of the Court's decision. 149 The per curiam opinion ended by
brushing off justiciability concerns:
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are the Members of this Court, and none stand more
in admiration of the Constitution's design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their legislatures,
and to the political sphere. When contending parties invoke
the process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought
responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues
the judicial system has been forced to confront. 150

In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas, maintained that the Florida Supreme Court had also violated Article II. 151 In the Chief Justice's view, his Court had to enforce Article II by determining
whether the state court had altered its Legislature's directions
concerning the appointment of electors. 152 Here the Florida Supreme Court had done so by overriding the Secretary of State's
reasonable exercise of her delegated statutory discretion (1) to
enforce the Legislature's deadline for certification and to disregard untimely recounted ballots/ 53 and (2) to interpret "legal
vote" as not requiring the counting of improperly marked ballots.154
148. Id at 106-07.
149. Id at 110.
150. Id at 111.
151. Id at 533-39 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 1, cl. 2,
which provides that "[e]ach State shall appoint [presidential electors], in such manner as
the Legislature thereof may direct") (emphasis added).
152. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111-15 (making this point and stressing that Article II
created an exception to the usual federalism principle of deference to state judiciaries in
interpreting their own Jaws). The Constitution thus required the Court "to undertake an
independent, if still deferential, analysis of state Jaw .... To attach definitive weight to
the pronouncement of a state court, when the very question at issue is whether the court
has actually departed from the statutory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility
to enforce the explicit requirements of Article II." Id at 114-15.
153. Id at 119-20. Likewise, the state court had no business reviewing the canvassing boards' exercise of their statutory discretion to decide whether or not to count ballots
received after the deadline. Id at 121-22. Another interpretive problem was that the
Florida court had "emptie[d] certification of virtually all legal consequence." Id
154. Id at 118-20 (declaring that the Florida Supreme Court had impermissibly substituted its "peculiar" interpretation that the statute mandated counting votes that had
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Four Justices dissented. Justice Breyer chastised the Court
for unnecessarily becoming entangled in the political process of
selecting a President, especially since two federal laws left such
electoral matters to political resolution. 155 First, the Twelfth
Amendment empowers Congress to count electoral votes. 156
Second, an 1887 federal statute authorizes states to attempt to
settle any electoral disputes (either directly or by delegation to
courts) and Congress to determine any remaining controversies-including judging the legality of votes-according to specified rules. 157 Justice Breyer declared:
[I]n this highly politicized matter, the appearance of a split
decision runs the risk of undermining the public's confidence
in the Court itself. That confidence is a public treasure .... It
is a vitally necessary ingredient of any successful effort to protect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself.... [W]e
do risk a self-inflicted wound-a wound that may harm not
just the Court, but the Nation. I fear that in order to bring
this agonizingly long election process to a definitive conclusion, we have ... [abandoned] self-restraint. 158

Justice Souter echoed these political question concerns and
also suggested ripeness and mootness problems. 159 Moreover,
Justices Souter and Breyer faulted the majority for secondguessing the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of its state's
election law, which they deemed reasonable and not designed to
change the legislature's commands in violation of Article 11. 160
Both Justices concluded that the Court, having exercised jurisnot been marked according to the clear ballot instructions). The Chief Justice also found
that the Florida court had jeopardized its Legislature's wish to take advantage of 3
U.S.C. § 5, which guaranteed finality to a state's slate of electors if they were chosen under statutes enacted before the election and were selected six days before the Electoral
College met (i.e., by December 12). Id at 113-14, 120-22.
155. See id at 153-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id at 144 (beginning his opinion by declaring that "(t]he Court was wrong to take this case").
156. Id at 153.
157. Id at 153-58. Moreover, this statute aimed to avoid a repeat of 1876, when
Congress appointed a commission (including five Justices) to resolve the contested presidential election and Justice Bradley cast the deciding vote, which "embroiled Members
of the Court in partisan conflict, thereby undermining respect for the judicial process."
Id at 157.
158. Id at 157-58.
159. See id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("If this Court had allowed the State [to
proceed] .... it is entirely possible that there would ultimately have been no issue requiring our review, and political tension could have worked itself out in the Congress .... ").
160. See id at 130-33; id at 148-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting). They also argued that 3
U.S.C. § 5 authorized Congress, not the federal courts, to make the political determination as to the validity of each state's slate of electors. See id at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting); id at 148-49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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diction, correctly found an equal protection violation. 161 Nonetheless, they would have remanded so that the Florida court
could apply a uniform standard in a recount and determine
whether this process could be completed by December 18 (when
the electors were to meet). 162
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg agreed with Souter and
Breyer that (1) the Court had forsaken its ordinary principles of
judicial restraint and federalism/ 63 (2) the Florida Supreme
Court had reasonably interpreted state law/ 64 and (3) the remedy of stopping the recounts was improper. 165 They broke with
their seven colleagues, however, in concluding that the Florida
court's adherence to a general "intent of the voter" standard did
not constitute an equal protection violation. 166
B. THE REACTION OF THE LEGAL ACADEMY

In contrast to their generally warm embrace of Baker, law
professors overwhelmingly excoriated the Court's opinion. Indeed, about 550 of them signed a full-page ad in the New York
Times on January 13, 2001, which asserted:
By stopping the vote count in Florida, the U.S. Supreme
Court used its power to act as political partisans, not judges of
a court of law .... By taking power from the voters, the Supreme Court has tarnished its own legitimacy. As teachers
whose lives have been dedicated to the rule of law, we protest.

161. See id at 133-34 (Souter, J., dissenting); id at 145-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 133-35 (Souter, J., dissenting); id at 146-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. See, e.g., id at 123-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that these principles
counseled leaving presidential election disputes to the states and Congress). Justice
Ginsburg echoed these concerns and asserted that Article II did not justify the Court's
departure from its usual practice, rooted in federalism, of showing extraordinary deference to state court interpretations of state law, even when federal rights were at stake.
Id at 135-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 124, 127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 135-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Both dismissed the statutory Section 5 argument for the reasons given by Justices Souter and Breyer. See id at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 143-44 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens accused the majority of challenging the Florida courts'
"impartiality and capacity," thereby cynically undermining "the Nation's confidence in
the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law." Id at 128, 129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. See id at 126-27; id at 143-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
166. See id at 126-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that the Equal Protection
Clause did not authorize the Court to question the states' power either to set substantive
standards for determining whether a vote has been legally cast or to allow counties to
design their own balloting system, and distinguishing cases finding that votes had been
weighted unequally); id at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Florida Supreme Court's recount order would yield a result as fair as the earlier certification).
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To take another representative example, Erwin Chemerinsky
charged that "five conservative Republican justices handed the
election to the Republican candidate, George W. Bush." 167 He
argued that "haste" had led the majority to disregard various justiciability doctrines 168 and that the Court's decision "had no basis
in law or fact." 169 For instance, the Court failed to explain why
Florida's intercounty variation in determining which votes
counted- but not other inconsistencies such as differences in
voting machines and ballots- violated equal protectionP0
Chemerinsky also claimed that "the Court offered no persuasive
rationale for ending the recount." 171 Similarly, Bruce Ackerman
deemed the decision "a blatantly partisan act, without any legal
basis whatsoever," which "betrayed the nation's trust in the rule
of law. " 172
Some liberal scholars, however, recognized that hypocrisy
ran both ways. For example, Sandy Levinson maintained that
five conservative Republican Justices had engaged in "low" politics and asked:
How can one take seriously the majority's claims that their
award of the presidency to Bush is based on their deep concern for safeguarding the fundamental values of equality?
This majority has been infamous in recent years for relent-

Erwin Chemerinsky, The Self-Inflicted Wound, 2001 Cal. Bus. J. 8.
Id. Specifically, Bush's claim that the proposed recount would lack equality
could not be properly evaluated until after the recount had been completed and the state
judges had ruled on his objections; indeed, Bush may have retained his lead, thereby ob·
viating the need for decision. Id. Moreover, Bush lacked standing because he did not
allege any individual discrimination against him, but rather raised the equal protection
claims of Florida voters. ld. Thus, the Court issued an "impermissible advisory opin·
ion." Id
169. Id at 9.
170. ld. Furthermore, Florida (and many other states) did have a uniform stan·
dard-the intent of the voter-which satisfied equal protection concerns. Id
171. Id See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1093 (2001) (amplifying the theme that the Court should not have inter·
vened).
172. Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, 12 Am. Prospect 48 (Feb. 12, 2001).
Likewise, Professor Dershowitz accused the majority Justices of rendering a biased po·
litical decision that contradicted their own previous opinions (and the Court's precedent
generally) on standing, equal protection, and federalism. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice (Oxford U. Press, 2001). At the same time, however, he praised the War·
ren Court's expansion of constitutional rights, especially in electoral matters, without
mentioning that those opinions also ignored the controlling law. See id at 6, 70-71, 89,
119, 185-86. To his credit, however, Dershowitz acknowledged that liberals had sown the
seeds of Bush v. Gore through their strategy of resolving political problems (like abor·
tion) by relying on the Court to create new constitutional rights rather than engaging in
the political process. Id. at 190-97.
167.
168.
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lessly defending states' rights against the invocation of national legal or constitutional norms. 173

Yet Levinson also noted "[the] tension between the generally
nationalist, equality-protecting positions taken by the dissenters
and their esteem in Bush v. Gore for state autonomy and, concomitantly, for the different standards being applied in various
county recounts." 174 Professor lssacharoff highlighted similar
contradictions, but concluded that the Court should not have intervened because (1) government officials elected through a
properly functioning majoritarian political process could have
provided redress, and (2) the majority failed to articulate clear
constitutional principles to support its decision. 175
Conservative commentators such as Robert Bork derided
Justices like Stevens and Ginsburg for their new-found commitment to federalism and to judicial avoidance of political morasses, given their record of imposing a liberal agenda instead of
adhering to legal principles. 176 Judge Bork traced this approach
to the 1950s and 1960s:
During the era of the Warren Court, the contempt for law and
the desire to make major policy were so blatant that even the
court's supporters repeatedly warned that results reached
with so little respect for craftsmanship and candor made the
court vulnerable. We have learned that those failings, however egregious, have not lessened the power of the court to do
what it wants. There is, unfortunately, no particular reason to
believe that will change. Indeed, Earl Warren, the exemplar
of lawless judges, is now celebrated as a great and humane jurist.177

Bork, however, failed to see Bush v. Gore as part of that Warren
Court tradition, albeit serving conservative rather than liberal
political ends. Rather, he claimed that the decision "was a valiant effort, legitimate in law, to rein in runaway political passions

173.

Sanford Levinson, The Return of Legal Realism, 272 The Nation 8 (January 8,

2001).

174. Id. Perhaps the best example of liberal scholars providing a balanced and nuanced appraisal of Bush as an extension of the existing law governing elections, rather
than as a partisan political decision, is Issacharoff, et al., When Elections Go Bad (cited in
note 117).
175. Issacharoff, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 637-41,650-56 (cited in note 125).
176. Robert H. Bork, Sanctimony Serving Politics: The Florida Fiasco, 19 New Criterion 4, 8-11 (March, 2001) (citing as examples these Justices' opinions on abortion, school
prayer, gay rights, and single-sex military schools).
177. ld. at 8.

2001]

LOOKINGATBAKER v. CARR

389

and a lawless state court." 178 In Bark's view, however, only the
concurring Justices identified the proper constitutional rationale- Article II, which applied specifically to presidential elections.179 He recognized that the equal protection holding
"raise[ d] serious difficulties" because "similar disparities have
always existed within states under our semi-chaotic election
processes .... By raising that [inconsistency] to the level of a
constitutional violation, the court federalized state election
laws .... Ironically, several justices known for their concern
about the independence of the states struck a blow against federalism."180 Ultimately, however, Bork concluded that the end
justified the means: "The court's choice was between an inadequate majority opinion and permitting the stealing of a presidential election." 181 Like Bork, Judge Posner conceded the weakness of the majority's legal analysis, especially under the Equal
Protection Clause, but defended the decision as necessary to
prevent a national crisis. 182 Richard Epstein wisely declined to
endorse the Bark/Posner "constitutional emergency" justification.183 Instead, he contended that the sole (and persuasive)
rationale for the Court's intervention was to preserve the Florida
Legislature's Article II power to direct the selection of electors,
which the Florida Supreme Court had usurped through statutory
"interpretations" that grossly deviated from the written election
law. 184
In short, the voluminous commentary on Bush v. Gore has
mirrored the Court's ideological split. These political blinders

178. Id. at 11.
179. Id at 5-7.
180. Id at 5.
181. Id at 6.
182 The Triumph of Expedience, Harper's 31, 31-34 (May 2001) ("Triumph"); see
also Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election
Dispute and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 S. Ct. Rev. 1.
183. Professor Dershowitz has provided a convincing response: Resolution of the
presidential election dispute on nonlegal grounds by the politically unaccountable Justices represents a greater crisis than its resolution by political officials pursuant to the
Constitution. See Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice at 89-93, 130 (cited in note 172). He
stressed that the Justices are not "'self-appointed national saviors' with a roving commission to save us from ourselves even if we have selected other institutions to do the job."
Id. at. 90. Dershowitz's argument, however, applies with equal force to Baker and its
progeny-cases he lauds. See id. at 6, 70-71,89, 119, 185-86.
184. See Richard A. Epstein, "In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct'': The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 613 (2001); cf. Michael
McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 660-77
(2001) (maintaining that both the equal protection holding and the concurrence's Article
II analysis were legally sound, and rejecting the "constitutional crisis" rationale).
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have caused legal scholars to miss a crucial point: Bush is Baker
v. Carr in conservative garb.
III. A COMPARISON OF BAKER AND BUSH
A. SIMILARITIES
Baker and Bush are strikingly similar. A majority of Justices sought to resolve a perceived national electoral crisis that
seemed insoluble by ordinary political means. In both cases, the
Court abandoned the constraints of justiciability, federalism, and
equal protection law and precedent. 185 Finally, both decisions
featured acidic dissents containing nearly identical rhetoric. In
Baker, Justice Frankfurter feared that the majority's
[d]isregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the
Court's "judicial Power" .... may well impair the Court's....
authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword[which] ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its
moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the
Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from
political entanglements and by abstention from injectin~ itself
into the clash of political forces in political settlements. 1

In Bush, Justice Breyer cited Frankfurter's disciple Alexander
Bickel in arguing that the majority's decision
runs the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the
Court itself. That confidence is a public treasure .... It is a vitally necessary ingredient of any successful effort to protect
basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself.... [W]e do
risk a self-inflicted wound-a wound that may harm not just
the Court~ but the Nation. [W]e have ... [abandoned] selfrestraint.1~7

Because Baker and Bush are cut from the same cloth, I reject the current liberal orthodoxy, which canonizes Baker and
demonizes Bush. Nor can I agree with conservatives who applaud Bush while decrying the political excesses of the Warren
Court that Baker epitomizes. Rather, I submit that true respect

185. See supra notes 20-71 and accompanying text (summarizing and criticizing
Baker); supra notes 133-184 and accompanying text (examining Bush).
186. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
187. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157-58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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for the rule of law com~els the conclusion that both decisions
were normatively wrong. 88
Baker lacked support in the Constitution's text, history, and
precedent. For several decades, the Court had dismissed all constitutional challenges to state apportionments on two alternative
grounds: nonjusticiability under the Republican Form of Government Clause or equitable principles rooted in federalism.
Furthermore, the Court had consistently interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause as safeguarding the civil rights of individuals
and minority ~roups, not the general political (i.e., voting) rights
of majorities. 89 More specifically, the Court had never suggested that equal protection requires representation based exclusively upon population, because doing so would have contradicted both the understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's
framers and ratifiers and America's practice since 1789. Justice
Brennan simply whitewashed these seemingly insuperable political question and equal protection problems.
Instead, the Baker Court should have conceded that the urban voters' allegation-that Tennessee's apportionment statute
overweighted rural votes-did not implicate equal protection,
but rather the guarantee to each state of a Republican Form of
Government. 190 Justice Brennan then should have acknowledged that Luther v. Borden 191 did not hold all Guarantee Clause
complaints to be nonjusticiable, that the Court adjudicated many
such claims until 1912, and that for fifty years it had misconstrued Luther and its progeny as creating a blanket political
question bar. 192
As in the Luther line of cases, however, the Court should
have interpreted the Guarantee Clause with extraordinary deference to the political branches, who have primary responsibility
for enforcing its provisions and should not be second-guessed
except in the most egregious cases (such as approval of a state's

188. It would also be intellectually consistent to contend that both decisions were
correct. I will leave that argument to someone else.
189. Akhil R. Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 749, 75354 (1994).
190. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 122 (cited in note 60). See also McConnell,
24 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy at 113-16 (cited in note 125) (arguing that the Court should
~val~ate electoral districting based upon the Guarantee Clause and accordingly should
mvahdate schemes that systemically prevent effective majority rule, as Tennessee's did).
191. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
192. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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establishment of martial law). 193 The Court therefore should
have respected the conclusion of Congress and the President
that state apportionment schemes based on interest-group and
geographical representation (e.g., favoring agricultural over urban areas) did not render their governments nonrepublican. 194
Although a "democratic" government might require representation based on equal population, a "republican" government does
not, as the Senate and the Electoral College illustrate. 195
In a nutshell, a Supreme Court disciplined by law would
have rejected the constitutional claims presented in Baker. The
same goes for Bush v. Gore.
The justiciability barriers in Bush were at least as formidable as those in Baker. As Bush was not a Florida voter, it is unclear why he had standing to allege that Florida's differential
vote-counting standards violated his individual equal protection
rights. 196 Moreover, the Constitution and implementing congressional legislation contemplate political rather than judicial resolution of disputes over presidential elections. 197 Initially, at the
193. In Luther, the Court concluded that Rhode Island's temporary imposition of
martial law had not violated the Republican Form of Government Clause, but suggested
that permanent martial law would. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 45. Presumably, the Court could
also invalidate as "nonrepublican" state attempts to set up a monarchy or a theocracypossibilities seen as realistic at the time Article IV was ratified.
194. See supra notes 38-42,45-50,63-66 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 40, 45-48, 65-66 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice at 77-81 (cited in note 172) (providing a
detailed analysis of standing); Chemerinsky, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1097-1102 (cited
in note 171); see also United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742-47 (1995) (holding that
Louisiana voters who did not live in a congressional district that they alleged had been
racially gerrymandered lacked the individualized harm required for standing); Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 393, 472-90 (1996) (endorsing the Court's bedrock requirement that a plaintiff must show a personalized injury in order to challenge a constitutional provision like
the Equal Protection Clause that protects individual rights). Third parties do not have
standing to raise the claims of others, absent certain extraordinary circumstances (e.g.,
where the third party either lacks the ability to sue or enjoys a uniquely close relationship
with the plaintiff). See Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts 79-82 (West Publishing Co., 5th ed. 1994) (describing the relevant cases). None of these exceptions applied
to the relationship between Bush and the Florida voters.
197. See supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text. The Twelfth Amendment provides that the Vice President "shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates [transmitted by the state electors] and the votes shall
then be counted." It is not clear whether the Vice President or Congress should do the
counting, although the latter has assumed this function. Furthermore, the Amendment
could be read as imposing a mere nondiscretionary clerical responsibility to count the
votes.
Nonetheless, Congress has long construed this Amendment, in conjunction with the
Necessary and Proper Clause, as authorizing it to regulate such details as the electors'
performance of their duties and the procedures for election contests. See James C.
Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27

2001]

LOOKINGATBAKER v. CARR

393

state level, courts (as in Florida) usually have statutory jurisdiction over such controversies, and Article II arguably gives each
Legislature power to review such judicial decisions and to appoint its own electors if it concludes that the courts ignored its
pre-election statutory directives. 198 Next, Congress ultimately
counts (and hence determines the validity of) each state's electoral votes. 199
These layers of political scrutiny implicate three justiciability doctrines. First, as Bush did not exhaust his remedies in Florida or in Congress, his claim did not seem ripe for review. 200
Second, success in either of these venues would have mooted his
case. 201 Third, under the political question doctrine, the ConstiL. & Contemp. Probs. 495, 498-500 (1962) (citing the relevant constitutional and statu-

tory provisions). This settled practice reflects a reasonable, albeit not inevitable, interpretation of the Constitution.
198. Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 authorizes the "Legislature" of "(e]ach State" to
direct the "Manner" of "appoint[ing] ... electors." Quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146
U.S. 1, 35 (1892), the Court interpreted this provision as a grant of "plenary power"
which could be exercised at any time. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). Hence, the
Florida Legislature may have had the authority to review its judiciary's decisions regarding the presidential election to ensure fidelity to its statutory commands, wholly independent of the United States Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over the same subject matter. See, e.g., John Yoo, A Legislature's Duty, Wall S. J. A24 (Dec. 4, 2000)
(arguing that the Florida Legislature had the power and duty to appoint its state's 25
electors directly).
The majority's emphatic reaffirmation of McPherson is odd because its central
premise-that the Constitution grants state legislatures absolute control over the selection of electors-has been undercut by Baker and its progeny, which limited state legislatures' power over apportionment that the Constitution seemed to make every bit as plenary as their power over presidential electors. See supra notes 20-50, 72-122 and
accompanying text. The Warren Court justified such restrictions by articulating a metaconstitutional principle (found in Article I, § 2 and in the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments) that our democracy requires representation based
on the equally weighted vote of each citizen. That precept cannot easily be reconciled
with the Bush Court's recognition of a state legislature's authority to appoint presidential
electors itself. See Issacharoff, et a!., When Elections Go Bad at 105-06 (cited in note
117) (noting this tension).
199. See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
200. See Pushaw, 81 Cornell L. Rev. at 493-97 (cited in note 196) (examining cases
and scholarship on ripeness). Concededly, ripeness turns largely on a discretionary determination concerning "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to
the parties of withholding court consideration." Abbon Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
148-49 (1%7). The Justices might have concluded that this test had been met. First, the
constitutional legal questions may have been deemed suitable for immediate decision
because the Florida Supreme Court had issued its final interpretation of its state's law.
Second, delay may have caused hardship by allowing the recount to continue and the
winner to be announced, only to have the Court invalidate the outcome-or perhaps not
to have had enough time to issue a judgment at all, given the tight deadlines for selecting
presidential electors (with December 18 as the drop-dead date for ensuring that Congress
would count Florida's electoral votes). Unfortunately, the Court did not explain why it
found the case to be ripe.
201. See Pushaw, 81 Cornell L. Rev. at 490-93 (cited in note 196) (analyzing moot-
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tution could have been interpreted as committing to Congress
final authority to decide election disputes. 202 The Court thus had
multiple grounds for declining judicial review, at least until the
political process had run its course.203
Even putting aside these justiciability concerns, nothing in
the Equal Protection Clause's language, history, or precedent
prohibited inconsistencies within states in counting votes. 204 The
ness). Obviously, the possibility that an action may become moot (which always exists)
does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Justices undoubtedly knew
that the Florida Legislature had announced its intention to name its slate of electors for
Bush, which would have mooted the case (although Gore might then have sued to challenge the Legislature's authority to act unilaterally). Conversely, unexpected failure in
Florida (or in Congress) would have kept Bush's claims alive. He may have lost the opportunity to have them adjudicated, however, if Congress had rejected his arguments at a
date too late to have permitted the Court to decide.
202. See, e.g., lssacharoff, et al., When Elections Go Bad at 61-62 (cited in note 117);
Chemerinsky, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1105-09 (cited in note 171). Admittedly, Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1%2), created a discretionary multi-factor test which brought many
previously "political" questions within the purview of judicial review. See supra notes
25-26 and accompanying text (outlining Baker's new approach); see also Pushaw, 81
Cornell L. Rev. at 498-99 (cited in note 1%) (summarizing the post-Baker political question cases).
The Court, however, could have declined jurisdiction based on almost any of the
Baker criteria, such as "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department." Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. An essay written long before Bush, and thus unbiased by political preferences, supports this conclusion. Albert J.
Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 2630 (1968) (arguing that the Court would likely apply Baker to rule that the Twelfth
Amendment grants to Congress fmal power to resolve disputes concerning presidential
electoral voting).
203. Cf. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993) (reaffirming that federal judges generally should defer their consideration until state proceedings concerning legislative apportionment have been completed).
204. Seven Justices accepted the equal protection rationale. See Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 104-11 (2000) (per curiam opinion joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.); id at 133-35 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 145
(Breyer, J., dissenting). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev.
737, 758, 763-64 (2001) (contending that this equal protection holding, although appealing as a potential avenue for expanding voting rights, had no basis in precedent or history
and was not logically explained); Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 679, 684-85 (2001) (pointing out that all previous equal protection cases had
involved a state's pre-election classification of voters based upon factors such as race,
place of residence, wealth, or party).
The concurring Justices identified an additional constitutional offense: The Florida
Supreme Court had violated Article II by changing its Legislature's prescribed certification deadline and its delegation of power to various state executive officials (such as the
Secretary of State) and agencies (such as the county canvassing boards). Id at 112-22
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), discussed supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text. It
may well be that the Florida Justices' political leanings influenced their statutory construction and that other interpretations were more reasonable. Nonetheless, existing Supreme Court precedent mandated extreme deference to state court explications of state
law as long as they had some plausible basis, and the Florida court's interpretation
seemed to meet this exceedingly lenient test. See id at 135-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting),
discussed supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text; see also Harold J. Krent, Judging
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Court's creation of a new equal protection right to be free from
such discrepancies seems as specious as the Baker Court's assertion that this Clause requires apportionment based solely upon
population. 205
In sum, Bush is the conservative child of Baker. Both cases
reached incorrect results through similarly defective reasoning.

B. DIFFERENCES
Critics on both ends of the political spectrum might reject
my analogy because of seemingly major distinctions between
Baker and Bush. Although I readily acknowledge certain differences, they have a negligible effect on my thesis.
1. The Conservative Response

Conservatives might argue that Bush is far less radical than
Baker in terms of both its novelty and impact. Baker repudiated
the traditional idea that the judiciary plays a limited role in our
federal system-most importantly, that the justiciability doctrines impose barriers to judicial review and that federalism generally precludes federal judicial interference in internal state political matters. More specifically, Baker, Gray, and Reynolds
reversed the Court's uniform precedent refusing to tamper with
state apportionment decisions and its unbroken century-old understanding that the Equal Protection Clause did not apply to
this area. Instead, Baker and its progeny authorized federal district courts to reconstruct state governments qua governments.
These cases thereby inflicted a wound to federalism far more
devastating than the judicial thrusts that struck down pieces of
legislation produced by state governments on social, cultural,
and moral issues (e.g., contraception and crime) that had formerly been reserved to the states.Z06
Judging: The Problem of Secondguessing State Judges' Interpretation of State Law in Bush
v. Gore, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 493 (2001) (setting forth this argument in exhaustive detail); Robert J. Pushaw, The Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Question Doctrine, and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reply to Professors Krent and Shane, 29 Fla. St.
U. L. Rev. 603,616-19 (2001) (agreeing with this position).
205. These cases illustrate the more general danger of a textualist approach that ignores the Constitution's structure and history. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional
Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of
Article Ill, 1997 B.Y. U. L. Rev. 847, 847-55.
206. See Grant S. Nelson and Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce
Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve
State Control Over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 113-19 (1999) (defending a classical
Federalist theory of federalism that views uniformity as beneficial in commerce but det-
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Baker, then, was a pathbreaking opinion that has had a
pervasive, profound, and long-lasting impact. That is precisely
why Chief Justice Warren deemed it "the most important
decision" of his tenure. 207 By contrast, conservatives could claim
that, although Bush made a big initial splash, its ripple effect
should be comparatively small, for two reasons.
First, while Baker broke new ground, Bush trod a well-worn
path. Baker set a "precedent" that the Justices could intervene
to resolve political crises by superimposing their own political
beliefs onto the Constitution through the creation of new equal
protection principles. It is not a coincidence that the majority in
Bush soothingly cited several Warren Court cases establishing
the right to equal treatment in voting matters.ZCJB Moreover, because Baker refashioned the political question doctrine into a
multi-factor "test" that is almost entirely discretionary/09 the
worst that can be said of the Rehnquist Court is that it stepped
in imprudently, not unlawfully. In short, the very fact that Baker
had already been decided makes Bush less objectionable.

rimental as to social, cultural, ideological, and moral issues).
207. See The Warren Court: An Editorial Preface, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 219, 220 (1968)
(citing a statement by Chief Justice Warren). The watershed significance of Baker was
not lost on Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, who wrote unusually long and vituperative
dissents. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
208. Sec Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104-05 (citing, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). In fairness, I
should point out that not all scholars have dismissed the majority's equal protection holding. For example, Professors Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes have characterized Bush as
the third stage in the development of the constitutional law of elections. First, the Court
struck down state statutes imposing exclusionary conditions on access to the ballot box,
such as white skin color (e.g., Herndon) and poll taxes (e.g., Harris). Issacharoff, et a!,
When Elections Go Bad at 4, 7, 45,47 (cited in note 117). Second, through the "one person, one vote" principle, the Court redesigned state legislatures to address how votes
were aggregated to produce electoral outcomes. Id at 4, 7, 45-47. Third, Bush "extend(ed] these doctrines to the micro-level of the actual operation of the election machinery" in a presidential contest. Id at 47. Bush featured the same basic structure as
those opinions, particularly in reaffirming that if state legislatures chose to allow popular
election, they had to ensure equal protection. Id at 44, 47.
Professor McConnell has contended that, although as an original matter the Court
had little legal basis for extending the Fourteenth Amendment to voting rights, this jurisprudence is now firmly entrenched. McConnell, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 663 (cited in note
185). He concludes that the Bush majority properly applied established equal protection
principles in striking down the Florida Supreme Court's order, which had allowed canvassing boards to use inconsistent and arbitrary vote-counting rules that had been formulated for partisan political reasons. Id. at 659-73; see also John C. Yoo, In Defense of the
Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 784-89 (2001) (arguing that federal judicial
intervention into state electoral matters has become routine and that, more generally, the
Rehnquist Court has taken an activist role in asserting its supreme power to interpret the
Constitution in many crucial areas).
209. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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Considered from a purely political perspective, this argument has great force: What's good for the left-wing goose
(Baker) should be good for the right-wing gander (Bush). Nonetheless, from a legal standpoint, conservatives should hesitate to
make it because it contradicts their advocacy of traditional conceptions of adjudication and judicial restraint. Under their
model, constitutional decisionmaking should involve identifying
principles of law (found in the Constitution's text, history, and
precedent) and applying them consistently across time-not creating an unprecedented equal protection "right" (to uniform
standards in counting ballots) and suggesting that it will control
only that case. 210 Similarly, champions of judicial self-discipline
should not invoke the malleability of the justiciability doctrines
to excuse the Court's intervention. On the contrary, restraint
should have led the Justices to exercise the (admittedly vast) discretion allowed by those doctrines to avoid becoming entangled
in the presidential election dispute.
Second, conservatives might predict that, unlike Baker,
Bush will have a minimal ·future impact. Indeed, the Court admitted as much by confining its holding "to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes
generally presents many complexities." 211 If by "the present circumstances" the majority meant presidential elections decided
by razor-thin margins necessitating a recount in one state, then
Bush will almost surely never rear its head again. Even if "the
present circumstances" were construed to encompass all contested elections, however, the opinion focused narrowly on
court-ordered recounts, not statutory differences among (and
within) states concerning items such as voting machines, ballot
designs, and the qualifications of canvassing board members. 212
210. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109 (stressing that its holding was "limited to the
present circumstances"); Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice at 77, 81-84 (cited in note 172)
(noting that many commentators, including some conservatives, had criticized this aspect
of the majority's opinion). I have elsewhere described in detail the classical understanding that courts should not make new law, but rather should ascertain and apply preexisting rules in light of precedent in order to ensure continuity and certainty. See
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Anicle Ill's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions
of Federal Courts, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447,449-50, 472-79 (1994); Robert J. Pushaw,
Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Couns and the Structural Constitution, 86 Iowa L.
Rev. 735,741, 809,827 (2001).
211. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109.
212. The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise
of their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections. Instead, we are presented with a situation where a state court with the power to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount [without] some assurance that
the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are
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Concededly, Bush's long-term doctrinal impact will be negligible compared to Baker's. Again, however, true conservatives-who value the consistent judicial application of legal principles over time-should be alarmed by the Court's apparent
caveat that its new Equal Protection Clause "law" will apply to
that case alone. Moreover, despite this cautious language,
Bush's broad reading of that Clause may invite litigation over
discrepancies in ballot format and counting-and hence lead to
further judicial lawmaking adventures.
Finally, conservatives may contend that Bush dealt with the
election of the President-a quintessentially national interest
even though states run the election machinerf 13 - whereas
Baker involved the state's own legislature and implicated no
genuine federal interest. This distinction has real bite. Nonetheless, for better or worse, our Constitution leaves the selection of
presidential electors largely to state governments.214 Thus, Bush
did infringe upon state control over elections, albeit not as egregiously as Baker.
In conclusion, Bush admittedly cannot match Baker for
novelty, impact, and intrusiveness. None of these factors, however, undermines my theme that the Court's process of deciding
these two cases was remarkably similar-and similarly unconservative.
2. The Liberal Critique
Liberals might highlight two key distinctions. First, Baker
created constitutional electoral law that the Court intended to
(and did) follow in later cases, while Bush was "limited to the
present circumstances. "215 This argument is powerful in consatisfied.
Id.

213. The concurring Justices made precisely this point. See id at 112-15 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring).
214. For that reason, the Warren Court apportionment cases most directly on point
are those involving state districting that affected federal congressional elections. See
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (House of Representatives) and Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963) (Senate), discussed supra notes 72-96 and accompanying text. See
also Issacharoff, et al., When Elections Go Bad at 4-7, 24-25, 62, 75 (cited in note 117)
(recognizing the direct federal constitutional and statutory commands that govern pr~si
dential elections and the unique national interest involved, but noting that the Constitution still grants the states control over most of the pertinent election procedures-including the resolution of disputes between candidates).
215. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109. See Auerbach, 1964 S. Ct. Rev. at 70-71 (cited in
note 52) (emphasizing that "one person, one vote" was a true constitutional. principle
"for an expanding future," not a rule for "the passing hour") (quoting Benjarrun N. Car-
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trasting Bush to several apportionment cases, but not Baker itself. There the majority held that Tennessee voters had a justiciable equal protection claim but studiously avoided explaining
how that Clause had been violated, hoping that the threat of discretionary reapportionment b~ federal judges would compel legislatures to act on their own. 16 Only when coercion failed did
the Court articulate a legal ~rinciple for legislative representation-one person, one vote.Z1
Nonetheless, the Court has adhered to that maxim ever
since, in contrast to its apparent desire to restrict the Bush holding to its facts. This difference, however, has no bearing on my
thesis: that both the Warren and Rehnquist Courts manufactured new equal protection law, regardless of how they intended
to apply it in the future. 218
Second, liberals might maintain that the Court in Baker
sought to further democracy and vindicate individual voting
rights, whereas in Bush it thwarted these goals. 219 I have no readozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 83 (Yale U. Press, 1921)).
216. See supra notes 22-50 and accompanying text. Baker thus constituted the worst
kind of advisory opinion-one that provided no legal advice. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any "Dear John" Letters: Advisory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 Geo. L.J. 473 (1998) (book review) (discussing this practice).
The Baker Court's pressure tactics seem at least as offensive as the Bush Court's
"one-shot deal" approach.
217. See supra notes 72-122 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of this
standard).
218. Professor Issacharoff unfavorably contrasts Bush with the reapportionment
cases, which he deems a successful intervention into the political arena because the Court
set forth a clear constitutional standard of "one person, one vote." Issacharoff, 68 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 640-41, 656 (cited in note 125). I am not persuaded, however, that a fabricated constitutional doctrine becomes legitimate merely because it is crystallized in a
simplistic slogan. For instance, I do not think that Bush would be more defensible if the
Court had coined a "one recount, one standard" catch-phrase to govern judicial resolution of contested elections.
219. See, e.g., Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice at 70-75 (cited in note 172) (deeming
"curious" the majority's attempt to justify its exclusion of votes by invoking Warren
Court cases that increased the number of voters and that ensured all votes would be
weighted equally and counted correctly); Pamela S. Karlan, The Court Casts Its Vote,
N.Y. Times A31 (Dec. 11, 2000), reprinted in E.J. Dionne, Jr. and William Kristol, eds.,
Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and Commentary 262-63 (Brookings Institution Press,
2001) ("Commentary") (arguing that the Court in Bush (1) risked its reputation as a protector of voting rights by halting the recount of lawful votes, and (2) should not have intervened because the political process was actively trying to resolve the problem-unlike
the situation in the 1960s, when the Court had to step in because legislatures would not
reform themselves); Issacharoff, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 638-41, 650-56 (cited in note 125)
(to similar effect). But see Dionne and Kristol, eds., Commentary at 284-87 (reproducing
an essay by Richard Epstein titled Constitutional Crash Landing and originally published
in the Dec. 13, 2000 edition of the National Review Online contending that voters did not
need Court-ordered reapportionment to participate equally in the election, but simply
had to follow the directions on the ballot).
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son to doubt that the Warren Court sincerely thought it was
promoting democracy and the right to suffrage by mandating
legislative representation based upon equal population. Yet I
also have no basis for questioning the good faith of the
Rehnquist Court's belief that it was saving the democratic process and upholding the integrity of the votes cast. After all, the
majority cited undisputed evidence that certain county canvassing board members had repeatedly altered their standards for
determining whether a ballot had been legally marked, 220 for the
apparent (some would say transparent) partisan purpose of trying to help Al Gore garner more votes. 22 The Justices also must
have been suspicious that the Florida Supreme Court, composed
entirely of Democrats, decided nearly every significant legal issue in favor of Gore, the Democratic candidate.222 Thus, in their
220. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106-08.
221. Millions of Americans watching the hand recounts on television concluded that
the changing standards reflected partisan motives, especially because it occurred in heav·
ily Democratic counties and a more lenient standard (e.g., counting ballots that had been
indented but not dislodged) would pick up votes that had not been detected by machines,
which had twice given Bush the edge. Indeed, even fair-minded Democrats acknowledged this problem. See, e.g., Alan Brinkley, What Now?, Slate (Nov. 22, 2000), reprinted in Commentary at 195 (cited in note 219) ("(H]aving rejected that standard (i.e.,
allowing dimpled chads] earlier in the counting, it seems to me politically unwise, to say
the least, to change the standard simply because the original standard wasn't producing
enough Gore votes. That does seem calculating and unfair to me, even as a Democrat
and a Gore supporter.").
The Justices did not mention the unpleasant possibility of naked partisanship, but
one can safely assume that they were aware of it, given the relentless media coverage.
222. See, e.g., Triumph at 36 (cited in note 182) ("The Florida Supreme Court knew,
of course, exactly what kind of recount procedures to adopt in order to maximize the
likelihood that Gore would overtake Bush's lead.") (quoting Richard Posner); Stuart
Taylor, Jr., Why the Florida Recount Was Egregiously One-Sided, Nat'l Journal 3932-33
(Dec. 23, 2000), reprinted in Commentary at 332-36 (cited in note 219). This suspicion of
political bias likely explains the unusual conclusion of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas that Florida's high court had changed-not merely interpretedits state's election statutes. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 116-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), discussed supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text. Although neither the
concurring nor the per curiam opinion contains a direct accusation of partisanship, Justice Stevens assailed the majority for an "unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality
and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote count
were to proceed." See id at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
When judges enter the political thicket, they must be politically savvy. An example
is the Court's unanimous decision to decline review of the Florida Supreme Court's initial judgment against Bush because of uncertainty over whether the state court had
considered the relevant federal constitutional and statutory provisions. See Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam). Three Florida Justices
read between the lines and would have accepted this implicit invitation to save face by
holding for Bush. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262-70 (Wells, C.J., dissenting);
id at 1270-73 (Harding and Shaw, JJ., dissenting). Their four colleagues, however, issued
another opinion that seemed almost designed to strike the Supreme Court's conservative
Republican Justices as aggressively pro-Gore-for instance, by accepting 215 net Gore
votes in Palm Beach County submitted after the Florida Supreme Court's own Novem-
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minds doing nothing may have enabled one state's Democratic
partisans to bend (or perhaps break) the law to dictate the outcome of a presidential election. This prospect may have struck
the majority as worse than exposing themselves to the charge
that they decided the case to ensure the victory of the Republican candidate, George Bush. 223
Of course, it could well be that (1) the Justices' percer,tions
were shaped by their own political or ideological biases, 2 4 and
(2) the most accurate result would have been yielded by a manual recount under a general "intent of the voter" standard, subject to review by a judge to reconcile any discrepancies. 225 But it
is difficult for liberals to attack the Court on this score while simultaneously lauding Baker, which placed blind faith in the subjective political instincts of a majority of Justices about what will
best serve democracy and protect voting rights. 226 If Baker is legitimate as a matter of law, then it should make no difference
ber 26 deadline. See id at 1260. Considered from a raw political standpoint, these Florida Justices displayed naivete in failing to realize (or to care) that their decision would
prompt a reversal on the merits.
223. See McConnell, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 659 (cited in note 185) (making this
point). The Justices' knowledge that their judgment would effectively result in Bush's
election contrasts with Baker and its progeny, which established general standards that
did not benefit any particular candidate or party. The Warren Court likely understood,
however, that its opinion would greatly increase the voting strength of liberals.
The Rehnquist Court's dilemma was hardly unique. In post·election disputes, all
government actors (including judges) realize that their decisions are outcomedeterminative. See Issacharoff, et al., When Elections Go Bad at 3 (cited in note 117).
Not surprisingly, political officials continue to act in a partisan manner when given the
chance to interpret (or even alter) election laws. Id Courts must "act with tremendous
circumspection" because their integrity may be threatened by the political impact of any
potential course of action. Id Yet the failure of judges to intervene could undermine the
legitimacy of the political process itself. Id Thus, the Court was in a classic "damned if
you do, damned if you don't" situation.
224. This theory does not explain, however, why two of the Court's reliable liberals
on constitutional issues, Justices Breyer (a Democrat) and Souter (a Republican), joined
the majority's equal protection holding. Moreover, a straight party-line vote would have
aligned both Souter and Justice Stevens (a Republican) with the majority on every issue.
225. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 124-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stressing that the
Florida Supreme Court's order establishing such a process was constitutionally adequate).
226. Professor Sunstein, a liberal supporter of Baker, has argued that the Court in
Bush had a reasonable basis for concluding that its decision was necessary to restore order and avert a constitutional crisis, even if its legal reasoning was weak. Sunstein, 68 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 758-59, 768-69 (cited in note 204). Although I applaud Sunstein's evenhandedness, I reject the "constitutional emergency" justification. See supra note 182.
For similar reasons, I cannot accept Professor Issacharoffs claim that Baker, unlike
Bush, involved a true electoral crisis because the political avenues of redress had been
closed. See Issacharoff, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 638-41,650-56 (cited in note 125). Thereapportionment cases leave entirely to the Court's discretion the determination of
whether the political process has malfunctioned and a constitutional emergency has
arisen of sufficient magnitude to warrant intervention.
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whether its application produces a liberal or conservative political result.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Justices who decided Baker v. Carr undoubtedly had
pure motives. But the road to hell is paved with good intentions.
Legal giants like Justice Harlan and Robert McCloskey warned
that the Baker Court's adherence to political dogma (no matter
how noble) rather than legal principles would have dangerous
consequences.
They were right, as the Warren Court inadvertently laid the
groundwork for Bush v. Gore. Both the Court and legal scholars
should recognize that Baker and Bush are equally pernicious to a
constitutional regime based upon the rule of law.

